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This Article explores the evolution and interaction of the legal and cultural categories “food” and “drug” from the late nineteenth century to the
present. The federal statutory definitions of “food” and “drug” have always
been ambiguous and plastic, providing the FDA with significant regulatory
flexibility. Nevertheless, the agency is not necessarily free to interpret the definitions however it chooses. “Food” and “drug” are not only product classes
defined by food and drug law, but also fundamental cultural concepts. This
Article demonstrates that the FDA, as well as Congress and the courts, have
operated within a constraining cultural matrix that has limited their freedom
to impose their preferred understandings of these categories on American
society.
Nonetheless, history also provides ample evidence that lawmakers possess substantial power to mold the legal categories of “food” and “drug” so as
to advance desired policies. One explanation for this regulatory flexibility in
the face of deep-seated cultural conceptions is the indeterminate nature of the
extralegal notions of “food” and “drug.” The terms, as commonly understood, embrace nebulous, overlapping, and constantly evolving realms.
Moreover, the relationship between culture and law is not a one-way street
with respect to these categories. Although the regulatory apparatus has always had to take into account the extralegal understandings of “food” and
“drug,” the law in turn has exerted significant influence over their meaning
in broader culture.
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INTRODUCTION
The scope of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) power
is defined primarily by the list of product categories over which the
FDA has jurisdiction: food, drugs, cosmetics, devices, and biological
products.1 The statutory definitions of these categories delineate the
outer boundaries of the arena within which the agency operates.2
These definitions are also important because the FDA has different
degrees of power over different categories of products. In general,
the agency has greater authority over drugs, devices, and biological
products than it does over food and cosmetics.3 Therefore, the category to which the FDA assigns a product largely controls the shape of
the regulatory regime the agency will impose on that product.
Although the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)
and the Public Health Service Act dictate the proper classification of
some types of products,4 the statutory definitions are for the most part
ambiguous and plastic and provide the agency with great regulatory
flexibility. Courts will sometimes rein in the FDA when it interprets
the definitions creatively; the Supreme Court did so, for example, with
respect to the agency’s attempt in the 1990s to regulate cigarettes as
1
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 301–909, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2000
& Supp. V. 2005); Public Health Service Act §§ 351, 361, 42 U.S.C. §§ 262, 264 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004).
2
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(f)–(i), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)–(i) (defining “food,” “drug,” “device,” and “cosmetics”); Public Health Service Act §351(i), 42
U.S.C. § 262(i) (defining “biological product”).
3
Cf. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 301–909, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399; Public Health Service Act § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 262.
4
See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(f)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(2)
(stating that chewing gum is food); id. § 520(n), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(n) (stating that all contact lenses are devices); Public Health Services Act § 351(i), 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (listing
multiple types of products that are biological products).
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medical devices.5 In general, however, courts have granted the FDA
considerable latitude to interpret the product definitions to vindicate
“the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public health.”6 When
one considers the indistinctness of, for example, the FD&C Act’s definition of “food,”7 it sometimes appears that the FDA is empowered to
paint on a blank canvas.
But while Congress and the courts have granted the FDA wide
discretion, the agency is not necessarily free to interpret the definitions however it chooses. As Steven L. Winter has persuasively argued,
the power of lawmakers effectively to frame legal categories is significantly constrained by preexisting cultural understandings of these categories.8 “Food” and “drug,” the categories whose development and
interaction I explore in this Article, are not only the oldest defined
product classes in federal food and drug law; they are also fundamental cultural concepts.9 This Article demonstrates that the FDA, as well
as Congress and the courts, have operated within a cultural matrix
that constrains and limits their freedom to impose their preferred understandings of these categories on American society.10
Nonetheless, my research also provides ample evidence that
lawmakers have wielded substantial power to mold the legal categories
of “food” and “drug” to advance desired policies.11 One explanation
for this regulatory flexibility in the face of deep-seated cultural conceptions is the indeterminate nature of extralegal notions of “food”
and “drug.” The terms, as commonly understood, embrace nebulous,
overlapping, and constantly evolving conceptual realms.12 Moreover,
the relationship between culture and law has not been a one-way
street with respect to these categories. Although the regulatory apparatus has always had to take into account the extralegal understandings of “food” and “drug,” the law, in turn, has exerted significant
influence over their meaning in broader culture.13
This Article examines the evolution of the “food” and “drug” categories from the late-nineteenth century to the present, with a focus
5
See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131–32 (2000) (holding that Congress had precluded the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco
products as “drug delivery devices”).
6
United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969); see
also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)
(mandating that courts defer to reasonable agency determinations of the agency’s operative statutes if the statutory language is ambiguous).
7
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(f), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (defining
“food” as “articles used for food or drink”).
8
STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 209–10 (2001).
9
See infra Parts I–III.
10
See infra Parts II–III.
11
See infra Parts II–IV.
12
See infra Parts II–V.
13
See infra Parts II–III, V.
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on the complex interactions between the legal and cultural notions of
each category and the changing relationship of the “food” and “drug”
categories to each other. Part I discusses the development of categorization theory in social-scientific and legal scholarship, with particular
attention to the now-dominant “prototype” theory of human categorization. Part II considers the genesis of the “food” and “drug” definitions contained in the 1906 Federal Pure Food and Drug Act. Part II
also analyzes the interpretation of these definitions in early enforcement actions brought under the 1906 Act. Part III addresses the revisions to the definitions made by the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act and how that statute instituted a regulatory system that
contributed to a growing distinction between the cultural categories
of “food” and “drug.” Part III also illustrates the effects of the 1938
regime by describing how vitamin pills came to be legally categorized
as “food.” Part IV explores how the 1962 establishment of mandatory
premarket review of drug effectiveness further differentiated drugs
from food. Finally, Part V explains how amendments to the FD&C Act
in the early 1990s dramatically reshaped the “food” and “drug” categories and re-blurred the boundary between them. The Article concludes with a brief intellectual experiment, in which I ask the reader
to consider the viability of a hypothetical system in which food and
drugs are merged into a single category, “droods,” subject to a unified
regulatory regime.
I
THE PROTOTYPE THEORY

OF

CATEGORIES

Until recently, Western thought embraced the “classical” theory
of categorization, according to which categories were clearly delineated and all members of each category shared a set of “necessary and
sufficient” attributes.14 Starting in the 1950s, however, philosophers,
psychologists, and linguists abandoned the classical theory in droves.15
Perhaps the most influential figure in this exodus was psychologist Eleanor Rosch, whose studies of human categorization in the 1970s
demonstrated that common categories cannot be defined by reference to a single set of necessary and sufficient attributes. Rosch also
showed that people often perceive the “typicality” of category members to vary according to how many features they share with other
14

On the classical view of categorization, see GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANTHINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND xi–xii, 5–6, 9–11 (1987); EDWARD E. SMITH & DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS 23 (1981); Ronald Chen &
Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1149–50 (2004); Lloyd K. Komatsu, Recent Views of Conceptual Structure, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 500, 502 (1992).
15
For an intellectual history of the abandonment of the classical theory of categories,
see LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 12–57; Komatsu, supra note 14, at 502–03.
GEROUS

R

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-5\CRN508.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 5

FOOD, DRUGS AND DROODS

12-JUN-08

13:37

1095

members of the category.16 The work of Rosch and others brought
about a new leading (though not universally accepted) theory of categorization known as the “prototype” approach. According to this theory, the human mind constructs a category—such as “food” or
“drug”—with reference to a “‘central tendency’ or average of the category members.”17 The resulting fluid internal structure of a category
produces different “goodness-of-example” ratings for different members.18 Prototype effects also cause many categories to have “fuzzy”
boundaries. Consequently, for “less typical members, there is often
disagreement not only on the degree of typicality of the item, but also
on whether the item belongs in another category altogether.”19
Experiments demonstrate that the construction of categories depends greatly on context.20 In his influential book, Women, Fire, and
Dangerous Things, linguist George Lakoff discussed this phenomenon
from a broad cultural perspective. He argued that people organize
knowledge by means of culturally dependent frameworks of background expectations he called “idealized cognitive models” (ICMs)
and that “category structures and prototype effects are byproducts of
that organization.”21 For example, as this Article will discuss, the ICM
for “drug” has shifted in the past century, and this shift has affected
the typicality of particular drug products.22 Whereas the prototypical
drug in the late nineteenth century was a natural remedy whose safety
and effectiveness were established through longstanding practice and
traditional knowledge,23 today’s prototypical drug is a synthetic, labo16
LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 44–45; Chen & Hanson, supra note 14, at 1150–53. For
instance, in Rosch’s experiments, participants considered robins and sparrows to be better
examples of the category “bird” than owls and eagles; in turn, participants considered owls
and eagles to be better examples of “bird” than ostriches and penguins. LAKOFF, supra
note 14, at 44–45.
17
SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 106 (Phillip G. Zimbardo
ed., McGraw-Hill 1991) (1984) (McGraw-Hill Series in Social Psychology).
18
See LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 42–43.
19
Chen & Hanson supra note 14, at 1153. For example, studies have shown significant disagreement over whether a stroke is a member of the category “disease” or a pumpkin is a member of the category “fruit.” See id. (citing Michael E. McCloskey & Sam
Glucksberg, Natural Categories: Well Defined or Fuzzy Sets?, 6 MEMORY & COGNITION 468,
468–69 (1978)). Although scholars initially used Rosch’s work to argue that prototype
effects inevitably produce fuzzy category boundaries, it later became clear that “goodnessof-example” ratings can also occur with respect to rigidly bound categories. LAKOFF, supra
note 14, at 44–45.
20
See Chen & Hanson, supra note 14, at 1153.
21
LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 68.
22
See infra Parts II–III.
23
See CHARLES L. HUISKING, HERBS TO HORMONES: THE EVOLUTION OF DRUGS AND
CHEMICALS THAT REVOLUTIONIZED MEDICINE 8–10 (1968) (“Before the turn of the [twentieth] century the practice of medicine still employed methods and medications carried over
from Old World customs . . . . Most prescriptions were of the ‘shotgun’ type. They commonly contained a dozen ingredients . . . in the pious hope that if one did not cure,
another might, and none would be too harmful.”).
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ratory-developed substance that has been subjected to intensive scientific research and approved by the government.24
Another source of prototype effects is a phenomenon known as
“clustering,” in which a cluster of cognitive models or specific attributes combine to form a category.25 Although an item may satisfy
fewer than all of the models or attributes and still fall within the category, people tend to consider such an item a less typical category
member than the “ideal” case, which satisfies all of the models or attributes.26 Moreover, as Lakoff points out, “[w]hen the cluster of
models that jointly characterize a concept diverge [in the real world],
there is . . . a strong pull to view one as the most important.”27 The
typicality of a particular category member thus depends both on how
many of the cluster of attributes it satisfies and on a culturally contingent assessment of the relative importance of these attributes.28
For instance, the cultural category “food” seems to be formed by
a cluster of cognitive models, including, but not necessarily limited to,
the following: things that are chewed, things that are swallowed,
things used for their nutritive value, and things used for taste.29 Many
items generally considered to be food do not have all of these attributes. The typicality of a food seems to depend largely on how many of
the models the food satisfies. Consequently, an orange, which has all
four listed attributes, is probably a more typical “food” than orange
juice (which is not chewed), which in turn is a more typical food than
an orange lollipop (which is neither chewed nor used for nourishment). Moreover, as discussed below, the relative importance assigned to nutritive value and taste has varied over time, and this
development has affected the typicality of different foods.30 In short,
the cultural category “food” is subject to prototype effects that make
the category’s contours variable and hazy. Is parenteral nutrition, delivered intravenously, “food”?31 Is chewing gum “food”?32
24
See Michelle Meadows, The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and
Effective, 36 FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, July–Aug. 2002, http://www.fda.gov/Fdac/
features/2002/402_drug.html (explaining the various steps of the modern drug development and review process).
25
LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 74.
26
Id. at 75–76.
27
Id. at 75.
28
See id. at 79–84.
29
See infra Parts II.A, III.A, IV.
30
See infra Figure 1.
31
The FDA regulates parenteral nutrition products as drugs, not food. See CTR. FOR
FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDICAL FOODS n.2 (2007), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/
medfguid.html (“[P]arenteral (or intravenous) nutrient formulations . . . are regulated
under existing drug law.”).
32
The FDA regulates chewing gum as food. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act § 201(f)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(2) (2000).
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The prototype approach to category theory has recently made
some inroads into legal scholarship.33 Most notable is the work of
Steven L. Winter, whose attack on formalist approaches to legal rules
draws extensively from the prototype theorists’ assault on classical categorization.34 Winter contends that the entire notion of inflexible
rules based on “literal” language is nonsensical.35 Rules are based on
categories, he explains, and “most categories . . . are flexible and functional” cultural constructs with prototype effects.36 Winter describes
the process by which legal rules are understood as a complex interplay
of preexisting cultural categories and the rule’s underlying purpose.
A “rule forms its own gestalt structure or ICM consisting of the interaction of these . . . categories, and this ICM itself produces prototype
effects.”37
Winter focuses on how culture restrains law. He persuasively explains that “a rule risks misconstruction unless it has been fashioned
from the cultural ICMs and understandings already held by those governed by the rule.”38 The main limitation of Winter’s work is its failure to explore law’s constitutive power over culture—the way that
legal categories help shape cultural ones. Winter’s neglect of this phenomenon is understandable when he discusses, for example, the category “animal” in a law prohibiting “live animals on the bus,” because
the interpretation of “animal” in such a rule would probably not significantly affect society’s general understanding of the term.39 However, a different approach is necessary when considering the
categories “food” and “drug” in the context of federal food and drug
law. The following historical examination of these categories suggests
that the central legal definitions in a highly regulated field may mold
cultural categories while simultaneously being constrained by them.

33
See generally Chen & Hanson, supra note 14, at 1150–53 (describing the prototype
approach); Stuart P. Green, Prototype Theory and the Classification of Offenses in a Revised Model
Penal Code: A General Approach to the Special Part, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 301 (2000) (proposing to unify criminal law categorization beyond specific criminal offenses); Jay M. Feinman,
The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989) (discussing classification
problems in the fields of tort and contract law).
34
See WINTER, supra note 8, at 206–22 (pulling together ideas presented in a series of
articles that commenced in 1986).
35
See id. at 102.
36
Id. at 189.
37
Id. at 103.
38
Id. at 209.
39
Id. at 101 (citation omitted). Winter explains how cultural notions limit the meaning of “animal” in this particular law to those animals that would tend to cause problems
for other bus passengers; the law would not apply, for example, to a goldfish carried in a
bag. Id. at 101–03.

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-5\CRN508.txt

1098

unknown

Seq: 8

CORNELL LAW REVIEW
II
THE 1906 PURE FOOD

AND

12-JUN-08

13:37

[Vol. 93:1091

DRUGS ACT

A. “Food” in the 1906 Act
In 1880, G. W. Wigner drafted an influential model pure food
statute for the National Board of Trade that defined “food” as “every
article used for food or drink by man.”40 Various federal bills in the
1880s and 1890s, all unsuccessful, used this rather tautological definition or a variant of it.41 A few state pure food laws of the nineteenth
century also echoed Wigner’s “food” definition.42 Other states, however, thought the definition needed further elaboration. An 1899 Act
in Illinois, for example, defined “food” as “all articles, whether simple,
mixed, or compound, used for food, candy, drink, or condiment, by
man or domestic animals.”43 Congress took a similar approach when
it drafted the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act. That statute provided:
“The term ‘food,’ as used herein, shall include all articles used for
food, drink, confectionary, or condiment by man or other animals,
whether simple, mixed or compound.”44
The very inclusion of a “food” definition in the statute reflected
Congress’s unwillingness to rely on an extralegal understanding of the
category “food.” The term had various meanings that did not necessarily correspond to the set of products that Congress desired to regulate. Consider the following definitions of “food” from dictionaries of
the era:
What is fed upon; that which goes to support life by being received
within, and assimilated by, the organism of an animal or a plant;
nutriment; aliment; especially, what is eaten by animals for
nourishment.45
That which is eaten or drunk for nourishment; aliment; nutriment, in the scientific sense; any substance that, being taken into
40
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, PURE FOOD: SECURING THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT OF
1906, at 56 (1989); Richard Curtis Litman & Donald Saunders Litman, Protection of the
American Consumer: The Congressional Battle for the Enactment of the First Federal Food and Drug
Law in the United States, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 310, 313 (1982). Wigner, an Englishman,
almost certainly drew this language directly from the British food adulteration statute, as
amended in 1875. See The Sale of Food and Drugs, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 63, § 2 (Eng.)
(amending the Act’s definition of “food” to include “every article used for food or drink by
man, other than drugs or water”).
41
See YOUNG, supra note 40, at 56, 98–99 (discussing failed efforts to pass the Paddock
Bill during the 1890s); Litman & Litman, supra note 40, at 313–17 (discussing Congress’s
failures to approve the Hawley Bill and other proposed food and drug legislation during
the 1880s and 1890s).
42
In 1881, New York and New Jersey, for example, adopted the National Board of
Trade model legislation. YOUNG, supra note 40, at 63.
43
S. REP. NO. 57-3, at 10 (1901).
44
Pure Food and Drugs Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938).
45
WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 579 (Springfield,
Mass., G. & C. Merriam & Co. 2d ed. 1890) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S 1890].
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the body of animal or plant, serves, through organic action, to build
up normal structure or supply the waste of tissue; nutriment; aliment, as distinguished from condiment.46

Because of prototype effects, the absence of a statutory definition
would have left several critical questions unanswered. First, did the
law regulate food for animals? Everyone would likely have assumed
that a pure food statute addressed human food, but without clarification, it would not have been obvious whether “food” also embraced
animal food. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the statutes of the period
specified whether they regulated only food for man or food for man
and animals.47 Plant food, by contrast, was so far removed from the
prototypical “food” in the context of an adulteration statute that legislators did not find it necessary to explicitly exclude fertilizers from the
definition.48 Second, did the statute cover beverages? Lawmakers
were, of course, no less concerned about the adulteration of beverages
than the adulteration of solid foods. As stated by one court, however,
“The words ‘food’ and ‘drink,’ in common usage and understanding,
are . . . so far from synonymous that they import a plain and fundamental distinction, as universal as language and as old as the human
race.”49 Pure food laws of the late nineteenth century thus all expressly defined “food” to include “drink.”50
The drafters of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act also deemed it
necessary to state that condiments and confectionery were part of the
“food” category.51 As difficult as it might be for a twenty-first-century
mind to imagine, substances that were used primarily for taste were
not clearly included within the cultural category of “food” in 1906.
Food was “aliment,” which Funk & Wagnalls expressly distinguished
from “condiment.”52 Neither of the above-quoted dictionary definitions even mentions taste; nutritive value was apparently considered
the only fundamental characteristic of food.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American
food—despite important regional, class, and ethnic differences—was
generally bland, heavy, and greasy and thus not primarily associated
46
1 A STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 705 (New York, Funk &
Wagnalls Co. 1st ed. 1897) [hereinafter FUNK & WAGNALLS].
47
See S. REP. NO. 57-3, at 5–28 (providing an overview of each state’s food-related
laws).
48
Federal law still does not provide for the regulation of the sale of fertilizers; rather,
regulation of fertilizers is left primarily to the states. Allison Rees Armour-Garb, Student
Article, Minimizing Human Impacts on the Global Nitrogen Cycle: Nitrogen Fertilizers and Policy in
the United States, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 364 (1995).
49
Commonwealth v. Kebort, 61 A. 895, 896 (Pa. 1905).
50
See S. REP. NO. 57-3, at 5–28.
51
Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938).
52
FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 46, at 705.
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with taste or pleasure.53 Americans used relatively few condiments,
usually sweet pickles and sweet sauces.54 Herb gardens were common,
but herbs were grown “mainly for medicinal rather than culinary purposes.”55 Exotic spices barely affected mainstream American cuisine,
even as the growth of global commerce increased their availability.56
Moreover, the rise of centralized industrial canning between the early
1870s and 1900 diminished the inherent flavor of the foods that
Americans consumed.57 One leading food historian refers to “a vague
indifference to food” in Gilded Age America, “manifested in a tendency to eat and run, rather than to dine and savor.”58
Although Americans did not tend to seek sensory delight from
their main dishes, desserts and other sweets were a different matter.59
Americans had always craved sugar, and, after technological advances
in the mid-nineteenth century enabled the mass production of confectionery, consumption of candy soared among both the upper classes
(chocolates and bonbons) and the lower classes (penny candies).60
Nevertheless, Americans’ sweet tooth did not cause them to closely
associate “food” with taste; instead, they tended to treat confectionery
as something other than food. The following exchange from a 1902
congressional hearing regarding federal pure food legislation exhibits
this deeply ingrained cultural hesitation to classify candy as food.
MR. COOMBS. [Confectionery] is not food, is it?
MR. MOSES [of the National Confectioners’ Association]. Why not?
MR. RICHARDSON. I do not understand that it is food.
MR. MOSES. I suppose it would come under that general classification. It is not medicine, it is not drink; I do not know what you can
call it if it is not food.
53
HARVEY A. LEVENSTEIN, REVOLUTION AT THE TABLE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AMERICAN DIET 5–8 (1988). For discussions of regional, class, and ethnic variations, see id.
at 10–22, 101–05 (describing the elite’s fondness for French haute cuisine and their views of
immigrant cuisine); 1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICA 429 (Andrew
F. Smith ed., 2004) [hereinafter OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA] (discussing how ethnic foods eventually changed the “bland, non-diversified” American diet); 1 id. at 718–19 (describing
Italian-Americans’ particular resistance to Americanization of their cuisine); 2 id. at 471–80
(discussing American Southern cuisine).
54
RICHARD J. HOOKER, FOOD AND DRINK IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 121 (1981); LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 7.
55
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 6.
56
Id. at 5–6.
57
Id. at 30–43; see LESLIE BRENNER, AMERICAN APPETITE: THE COMING OF AGE OF A
CUISINE 16 (1999); 1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 635–37 (describing the rise
of food processing and industrialized canning in the late nineteenth century).
58
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 8.
59
See HOOKER, supra note 54, at 121–25, 251; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 6.
60
See 1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 176–79, 385.
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....
THE CHAIRMAN [Mr. Hepburn]. If you submit the question to the
children they would say it is food.
....
MR. RICHARDSON. But the general acceptation is not that it is
food.61

In the early 1900s, candy was considered to be distinct from
“food” in law as well as in general culture. By 1902, thirty-nine states
and the District of Columbia had enacted either special confectionery
provisions within their pure food laws or entirely separate pure candy
laws.62 In many states, pure candy laws were the only pure food laws
of any sort.63 The separate regulation of confectionery reflected the
special risk that the adulteration of candy posed to children. It also
reflected the fact that the concept of economic adulteration (the substitution of superior ingredients with inferior ingredients) was less
meaningful with respect to confectionery than with respect to conventional food, because many confections were manufactured goods with
no natural standards of purity, quality, or nutritional value.64 The discrete legal treatment of candy may have reinforced the extralegal tendency to view confectionery as a category different from food.
Cultural developments around the turn of the twentieth century
further marginalized taste as part of the concept of food. The 1890s
and early 1900s were a period of great influence for pseudoscientific
food faddists, who, in addition to promoting supposedly healthy eating practices, preached against “gluttony” and “gourmandizing.”65 In
a related development, American food advertisers tended to trumpet
their products’ positive health effects rather than their taste.66 In the
words of one scholar: “Though healthfulness has been a recurrent
theme throughout the life of American food advertising, never was it
utilized as regularly, or as brazenly, as in the decades on either side of
1900.”67 As shown below, in Figure 1, food advertisements between
61
The Pure-Food Bills H.R. 3109, 12348, 9352, 276, and 4342 for Preventing the Adulteration, Misbranding and Imitation of Foods, Beverages, Candies, Drugs, and Condiments in the District
of Columbia and the Territories, and for Regulating Interstate Traffic Therein, and for Other Purposes
Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 57th Cong. 69 (1902) [hereinafter
Pure-Food Bills Hearings] (statement of Robert H. Moses, Member, National Confectioners’
Association).
62
Id. at 64.
63
Id. at 65.
64
See id. at 65–66, 68.
65
BRENNER, supra note 57, at 16–17; see 1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at
592–94; 2 id. at 2–3.
66
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 33–34.
67
1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 5–7.
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1895 and 1910 referred to nutrition and health far more than they
referred to flavor.68
Finally, progressive reformers—in some instances the very same
ones who championed the enactment of the 1906 Act69—propagated
a strikingly ascetic and functional conception of food. The food reformers’ program was based on the new science of nutrition, which
focused on the three primary components of food—carbohydrates,
fats, and proteins—and the specific physiological functions each performed.70 The American agricultural chemist Wilbur Olin Atwater
and other adherents of this “New Nutrition” urged the public to
choose foods on the basis of their chemical composition rather than
their taste or appearance.71 In the words of Harvey A. Levenstein,
these reformers “suffered from the Achilles’ heel of so many food reformers: bland palates and underdeveloped appreciations of the joy of
eating.”72 They condemned strong seasonings, which characterized
immigrant cuisine, for taxing the digestive system, promoting alcoholism and other vices, and stimulating libidinous urges.73 Similarly, they
warned that overconsumption of sweets caused an unhealthy excess of
carbohydrates in the diet,74 lured children to drink, smoke, and gamble, and dangerously aroused women’s sexual passions.75 The credo
of the progressive-era food reformers was “eat to live rather than live
to eat.”76 As Leslie Brenner has observed: “Atwater’s legacy was that
Americans learned to see food not as the source of pleasure, but instead merely as sustenance and fuel.”77
Congress, focusing on protecting public health and the integrity
of the marketplace, obviously had no interest in excluding catsup,
spices, herbs, and candy from the scope of the Pure Food and Drugs
68

See infra note 165 and accompanying figure.
Consider, for example, the food reformer W. O. Atwater. See infra notes 71–77 and
accompanying text. Atwater was a pioneer in the establishment of the USDA’s Office of
Experiment Stations, and the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations endorsed federal pure food legislation. See Pure-Food Bills Hearings, supra
note 61, at 232. Hull House founder Jane Addams, who actively attempted to reform the
eating habits of the working class, also advocated the enactment of federal pure food laws.
See SHANNON JACKSON, LINES OF ACTIVITY: PERFORMANCE, HISTORIOGRAPHY, HULL-HOUSE DOMESTICITY 124–35 (2000); LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 105; YOUNG, supra note 40, at 186,
202, 233.
70
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 46; 2 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 201.
Scientists also identified minerals and water as food components. LEVENSTEIN, supra note
53, at 46.
71
BRENNER, supra note 57, at 17–18; LEVENSTEIN supra note 53, at 46–47, 72–74; see 1
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 678–79; 2 id. at 202.
72
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 56.
73
Id. at 5–6, 103–04; see 1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 282.
74
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 47.
75
1 OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 53, at 178–79.
76
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 79.
77
BRENNER, supra note 57, at 18.
69
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Act. To prevent any ambiguity, the drafters thus expressly included
items used for condiment or confectionery in the definition of
“food.”78 Many early FDA79 enforcement actions concerned such
products.80 Still, as late as 1922, the agency found it necessary to clarify that the “provisions of the act relating to food, as well as the specific provisions relating to confectionery, apply to confectionery.”81
Despite the multiple clarifications included within the “food” definition of the 1906 Act,82 one definitional qualification is strikingly
absent: the exclusion of drugs. Similar laws passed by the British Parliament in the latter part of the nineteenth century explicitly excluded
“drugs” from the definition of “food.”83 Because the 1906 Pure Food
and Drugs Act did not contain such an exception, the FDA and the
courts, after some initial uncertainty discussed below, interpreted the
Act to allow the dual classification of some articles as both food and
drugs. By permitting this overlap, American law probably better re78

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
The agency was not formally called the FDA until 1930, but for the sake of clarity, I
will refer to it by this name throughout the Article. For a chronology of the agency’s prior
names, see Peter Barton Hutt, A Historical Introduction, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 17 (1990),
reprinted in PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD & DRUG
LAW 4 (3d ed. 2007).
80
Twelve of the first fifty reported enforcement actions under the 1906 Act concerned products that could be characterized as condiments or confectioneries. Two such
cases concerned molasses. See 1,656 Cans of Molasses Contained in 139 Cases, Notice of
Judgment No. 24 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Oct. 17, 1908);
Twenty-Six Barrels of Molasses, Notice of Judgment No. 2 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection,
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., June 24, 1908). Three cases concerned vanilla extract. See Heekin
Spice Co., Notice of Judgment No. 48 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Apr. 2, 1909); Double Extract of Vanilla, for flavoring ice creams custards, sauces,
jellies, and pastry, C.B. Woodworth Sons Co., Rochester, N.Y., Notice of Judgment No. 5
(Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Aug. 13, 1908); Steinbrock & Patrick’s Marvel Extract of Vanilla, 2 oz., Notice of Judgment No. 14 (Bd. of Food & Drug
Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Aug. 27, 1908). Another four cases concerned honey. See
8 Barrels “Honey,” Notice of Judgment No. 18 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Aug. 28, 1908); 200 Cases “Honey,” Notice of Judgment No. 19 (Bd. of Food &
Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Aug. 28, 1908); 6 Barrels “Honey,” Notice of Judgment No. 20 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Aug. 28, 1908); 10
Cases “Honey,” Notice of Judgment No. 21 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Aug. 28, 1908). One case concerned pepper. See Kitchen Queen Black Pepper,
Notice of Judgment No. 28 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nov. 30,
1908). Another two judgments related to adulteration and misbranding of maple syrup.
See H.Y. Scanlon, Notice of Judgment No. 47 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Mar. 13, 1909); Four Hundred Cases and One Hundred Five-Gallon Cans of Maple
Syrup, Notice of Judgment No. 33 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
Nov. 28, 1908).
81
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. CIRCULAR 21, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE FOOD AND DRUGS ACT REGULATION 9 (8th rev. 1922).
82
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
83
See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Law [R]elating to the [S]ale of Food and Drugs,
1899, 62 & 63 Vict., c. 51, § 26 (Eng.), reprinted in 36–37 L.R. STATUTES 195, 202 (1899)
(“‘[F]ood’ shall include every article used for food or drink by man, other than drugs or
water.”).
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flected the extralegal conception of these categories than did English
law.
B. “Drug” in the 1906 Act
The 1906 Act defined “drug” to “include all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia or National
Formulary for internal or external use, and any substance or mixture
of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention of disease of either man or other animals.”84 This definition, the
product of political compromise,85 both reflected and shaped the concept of “drug” in broader culture.
In 1806, Noah Webster’s A Compendious Dictionary of the English
Language defined the noun “drug” as “a medical simple.”86 The volume, in turn, defined a “simple” as “a single ingredient, herb, plant,
drug.”87 In the next edition of his dictionary, published in 1828, Webster defined “drug” as follows: “The general name of substances used
in medicine, sold by the druggist, and compounded by apothecaries
and physicians; any substance, vegetable, animal or mineral, which is
used in the composition or preparation of medicines.”88 This sense of
“drug,” as an ingredient in a fabricated “medicine,” apparently dominated throughout most of the nineteenth century.89 This understanding of “drug” explains the seemingly redundant use of the words
“drug” and “medicine” in so many statute titles and drug catalogues of
the time.90 In the later years of the century, some American dictionaries moved toward treating “drug” and “medicine” as synonymous,91
but the distinction persisted in others.92
At the same time, the word “drug” was often defined to encompass various substances not embraced at all by today’s usage. The defi84

Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938).
See infra notes 110–25 and accompanying text.
86
NOAH WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 95 (1806).
87
Id. at 278.
88
1 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 68 (1828).
89
See, e.g., 3 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA 1781 (New York, The Century
Co. 1899) (“Any vegetable, animal, or mineral substance used in the composition or preparation of medicines.”).
90
See, e.g., An Act to Prevent the Importation of Adulterated and Spurious Drugs and
Medicines, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237 (1848); W. H. SCHIEFFELIN & CO., GENERAL PRICES CURRENT
OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC DRUGS, MEDICINES, CHEMICALS, EXTRACTS, PHARMACEUTICAL
PREPARATIONS, ETC. (1881) (available at the National Library of Medicine) (same).
91
FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 46, at 559 (defining drugs as “[a]ny substance used
as medicine”); JAMES STORMONTH, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 296, 601
(1885) (defining drug as “any medicinal substance”).
92
WEBSTER’S 1890, supra note 45, at 457 (“Any animal, vegetable, or mineral substance used in the composition of medicines.”); see also 2 UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1763 (Robert Hunter & Charles Morris eds., New York, Peter Fenelon
Collier 1898) (“Any substance, mineral, vegetable, or animal, used as an ingredient in
physic, or in the preparation and composition of medicines; a medicinal simple.”).
85
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nition in the 1890 edition of Webster’s, for example, included “any
stuff used in dyeing or in chemical operations.”93 The reference to
nontherapeutic industrial chemicals reflected the shape of nineteenth-century drug trade, in which pharmaceutical houses were not
yet wholly distinct from chemical manufacturers.94 In 1968, pharmaceutical executive Charles Huisking recalled:
In its original meaning, as understood at the turn of this century
when I entered the drug trade, the word drug meant any product of
the vegetable kingdom that was not chiefly used as food. It included herbs and spices, tanning agents, dyes (then chiefly of botanical origin), paint pigments, varnish gums and shellac,
turpentine and rosin, various vegetable, animal and fish oils.95

Indeed, when Congress debated the 1906 Act, dealers of paints and
oils voiced concern that the drug provisions would apply to them.96
Huisking’s quotation makes clear that regardless of whether one
used the term “drug” in its narrow (medicinal) or broad (industrial)
sense, the prototypical drug at the turn of the century was an unrefined product of natural origin, probably from the vegetable kingdom. When Huisking started his career in 1898, crude drugs, which
included “leaves, barks, roots, . . . fruits, seeds, oils, gums, waxes, dried
insects, fossils, and even some fish and animal products,”97 were “the
physician’s chief weapons against illness and disease”98 and the principal ingredients in most of the pharmaceutical companies’ formulas.99
Pharmacies had a characteristic “drug store smell,” emanating largely
from the spices and herbs used in compounding prescriptions.100 According to Huisking, even as late as 1910, “the cleverest, most forwardlooking of those engaged in the drug business . . . did not realize that
the day of botanical medicines was on the way out; that the founda93
WEBSTER’S 1890, supra note 45, at 457; see also FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 46, at
559 (“[A]n ingredient of chemical compositions used in the arts . . . .”).
94
HUISKING, supra note 23, at 60–61 (discussing pharmaceutical manufacturers with
chemical company names); David L. Cowen, The Role of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in SAFEGUARDING THE PUBLIC: HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL 72, 74–75 (John
B. Blake ed., 1970); Owsei Temkin, Historical Aspects of Drug Therapy, in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 3, 11–13 (Paul Talalay ed., 1964).
95
HUISKING, supra note 23, at 36.
96
Alteration, Misbranding, and Imitation of Foods: Hearing on H.R. 3109 Before the S.
Comm. on Manufactures, 57th Cong. 10 (1903) (statement of Porter J. McCumber, Chairman, S. Comm. on Manufactures) (“[W]e have had from a large number of dealers in
paints and oils letters in which they seem to infer that this definition of the word ‘drug’ will
require that their paints come up to a certain standard . . . .”).
97
HUISKING, supra note 23, at 36.
98
Id. at 42.
99
See id. (“All the brokers handled crude drugs. Every wholesale house had its crude
drug department and in many cases . . . this department may well have been the very
backbone of the business.”).
100
DRUGSTORE MEMORIES: AMERICAN PHARMACISTS RECALL LIFE BEHIND THE COUNTER,
1824–1933, at 137 (Glenn Sonnedecker, David L. Cowen & Gregory J. Higby, eds. 2002).
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tions of chemotherapy had already been laid down.”101 Only after
World War I did industrially synthesized chemicals begin to dominate
the pharmaceutical field in the United States.102
Because vegetable matter and, less commonly, animal matter remained the source of many drugs around 1900, the distinction between “drug” and “food” was often a blurry one, as it has been for
most of human history.103 Herbs were used for medicinal purposes
more frequently than for culinary ones, and they were often thought
to have drug-like effects even when used in cooking.104 The eighth
edition of the United States Pharmacopoeia (USP ),105 an influential drug
compendium prepared and periodically revised by a private standardsetting organization,106 included many crude herbs, such as aloe,
asafetida, belladonna, buchu, and foxglove. In addition, the volume
contained numerous non-herb items that are viewed today primarily,
or even exclusively, as food or food ingredients, such as corn starch,
sweet orange peel, cayenne pepper, cardomon seed, caraway seed,
cloves, cinnamon, and whiskey.107 Similarly, the third edition of the
National Formulary (NF ),108 another compendium, included articles
such as blackberry cordial, celery elixir, and orange wine.109
Wigner’s 1880 model act, discussed above, defined the word
“drug” as “all medicines for internal or external use,”110 and each of
the unsuccessful pure food and drug bills introduced in Congress during the 1880s and 1890s used some form of this language.111 When
Representative Marriott Brosius introduced a revised bill in 1900, however, the definition of “drug” had contracted dramatically. Section 5
of this bill limited the meaning of the term to “all medicines and preparations recognized in the United States Pharmacopoeia for internal
or external use.”112 Brosius probably narrowed the definition in response to pressure from the Proprietary Association, whose members—manufacturers of over-the-counter non-USP patent medicines—
101

HUISKING, supra note 23, at 78–79.
See id. at 127–28; Cowen, supra note 94, at 77–78.
103
See EDWARD KREMER & GEORGE URDANG, HISTORY OF PHARMACY 3–20 (Glenn Sonnedecker rev., 3d ed. 1963) (describing pharmacy practices during ancient times).
104
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 6, 103.
105
PHARMOCOPOEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (8th ed. 1905).
106
See generally LEE ANDERSON & GREGORY J. HIGBY, THE SPIRIT OF VOLUNTARISM: A
LEGACY OF COMMITMENT AND CONTRIBUTION (1995) (discussing the history of the United
States Pharmacopeia and its leadership between 1820 and 1990).
107
PHARMACOPOEIA, supra note 105.
108
AM. PHARM. ASS’N, THE NATIONAL FORMULARY OF UNOFFICIAL PREPARATIONS (3d ed.
1906).
109
Id. at 8, 11, 192
110
Litman & Litman, supra note 40, at 313.
111
See id. at 313, 314–317.
112
H.R. 9677, 56th Cong. § 5 (1900), reprinted in Pure-Food Bills Hearings, supra note 61,
at 236.
102
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hoped to keep their products outside the scope of federal law.113 The
definition of “drug” that Congress eventually enacted, though not restricted solely to compendial items, included the USP language and
also referenced the NF.114 To this day, the definition of “drug” in the
FD&C Act includes articles recognized in these compendia.115
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
United States Pharmacopoeial Convention’s Committee of Revision
selected drugs for inclusion in the USP based primarily, but not solely,
on frequency of usage, and the Committee expressly excluded patented or otherwise protected substances and preparations.116 Simple
vegetable and mineral drugs still dominated the USP VII (1892), the
edition in effect when Brosius first inserted the language.117 The USP
VIII (1905) deleted some long-used vegetable and inorganic chemical
drugs, but it was still composed primarily of such simple products.118
USP VIII was also, however, the first edition to set standards for some
synthetic medicinal chemicals. This decision commenced a gradual,
decades-long process during which synthetic compounds replaced
many of the familiar vegetable and mineral substances in the USP ’s
pages.119
The USP, first published in 1820, was extremely well established
by the early twentieth century, and prior laws, including the Federal
Import Drug Act of 1848 and some state statutes, had explicitly incorporated its standards.120 The 1906 Act’s reference to the upstart NF
was more surprising.121 The NF, published by the American Pharmaceutical Association (a national professional society of pharmacists)
113

See YOUNG, supra note 40, at 169.
Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938) (“[T]he
term ‘drug,’ as used in this Act, shall include all medicines and preparations recognized in
the United States Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary for internal or external use, and
any substance or mixture of substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or
prevention of disease of either man or other animals.”); YOUNG, supra note 40, at 265. The
1906 Act also provided that a drug was adulterated if it was sold under a USP or NF name
but differed from the standard of strength, quality, or purity set forth in the relevant compendium. Pure Food Act § 7, 34 Stat. at 769–770. Variances from these standards were
allowed, however, if the manufacturer plainly stated the variance on the label. Id.; see
YOUNG, supra note 40, at 265.
115
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2000).
116
See ANDERSON & HIGBY, supra note 106, at 162–63, 211–15.
117
See id. at 173, 180.
118
See id. at 214–15.
119
Id. at 193, 208–11; see also Glenn Sonnedecker, Drug Standards Become Official, in
THE EARLY YEARS OF FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUG CONTROL 28, 31 (Glenn Sonnedecker, ed.
1982) (Am. Inst. of the History of Pharm., Recent History and Trends of Pharmacy Series
No. 1, 1982) (describing the impact of the Pure Food and Drugs Bill on the USP and NF).
120
See Sonnedecker, supra note 119, at 28–29.
121
See Glenn Sonnedecker, The Changing Character of the National Formulary
(1890–1970), in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE NATIONAL FORMULARY: A SYMPOSIUM 21, 21–22
(Gregory J. Higby & Elaine C. Stroud, eds. 1989) (Am. Inst. of the History of Phar., Recent
History and Trends of Pharmacy Series No. 3, 1989); Sonnedecker, supra note 119, at 30.
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did not appear until 1888, and the version issued in 1906 was only the
third edition.122 The purpose of the NF was to allow physicians to
“forgo ready-made products and instead write out prescriptions that
required the special skill of an educated pharmacist.”123 The compendium, which included no medicinal simples, consisted mostly of quantitative formulas (some approximating secret commercial formulas)
for compounded preparations containing multiple active ingredients.124 The very inclusion of the NF in the Act’s definition of “drug”
probably contributed to the evolution of the meaning of the word
away from its nineteenth-century signification, “drug simple.”
Despite the Proprietary Association’s efforts, the 1906 definition
of “drug” was not limited solely to articles listed in the compendia. At
the urging of a group of prescription drug manufacturers and medical
writers, the Act further defined “drug” as “any substance or mixture of
substances intended to be used for the cure, mitigation, or prevention
of disease of either man or other animals.”125 This “intended use”
language, which was later also incorporated into the definition of “device,” survives largely intact in the FD&C Act today.126 Indeed, modern food and drug law is bedeviled by the question of how the phrase
“intended to” in these definitions should be construed. Regulated industries contend that intended use is established solely by representations made in labeling, advertising, and other promotion.127
Conversely, the FDA maintains that it can look to the overall circumstances of distribution, foreseeable use, actual use, and internal company documents to determine a product’s intended use.128 The
largely unexplored origins of the “intended use” provision, and their
implications for the phrase’s meaning, require further study.129
C. “Food” and “Drug” in Early Enforcement Actions
Early notices of judgment and reported cases provide several important insights into the initial understanding of the 1906 Act’s defini122

See ANDERSON & HIGBY, supra note 106, at 151–56.
Id. at 152.
124
See id. at 155–56; Sonnedecker, supra note 121, at 28, 31; Sonnedecker, supra note
119, at 32–33.
125
Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, § 6, 34 Stat. 768, 769 (1906) (repealed 1938); Alteration,
Misbranding, and Imitation of Foods: Hearing on H.R. 3109 Before the S. Comm. on Manufactures,
57th Cong. 4 (1903).
126
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1)(B), (h)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)
(1)(B), (h)(2) (2000).
127
See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 47 (“Throughout the Brown &
Williamson litigation, the tobacco industry asserted that no court had ever found that a
product was ‘intended for use’ or ‘intended to affect’ absent manufacturer claims regarding that product’s use.”); id. at 41–57.
128
See generally id. at 41–57, 77–87 (discussing intended use as it relates to food, drugs,
cosmetics, and the FDA’s thwarted effort to regulate tobacco).
129
I intend to explore these issues in a future article.
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tions of “food” and “drug.” First, courts sometimes treated the
definitions as mutually exclusive.130 By 1934, dual classification was so
widely recognized that a provision expressly permitting it was deleted
as “superfluous” from an early version of the 1938 FD&C Act.131 In
the years immediately following 1906, however, judges were not so certain.132 Second, the FDA and the courts looked to evidence other
than drug manufacturers’ explicit claims to determine the “intended
use” of products. Indeed, in the years immediately following the law’s
enactment, the FDA brought successful drug enforcement actions
against a number of non-USP, non-NF products for which no claims of
curing, mitigating, or preventing disease were made—at least none
that the agency or court mentioned.133 Moreover, dual use food-drug
products listed in the compendia were sometimes categorized as
drugs by the FDA in the apparent absence of disease claims.134 In
1907, the FDA’s Annual Report asserted: “The policy of the Drug Laboratory is to regard as drugs all ordinary food substances . . . whenever
specifically used for drug purposes. While it is not always easy to determine to which category the substance belongs, it can usually be
done either by the inspection of the label or by studying the trade
conditions.”135
Prior to 1938, relatively few court opinions explored the relationship between the definitions of “food” and “drug.” This dearth of
130
See, e.g., Transcript of Jury Instructions, United States v. Four Boxes of Mulford’s
Wintergreens, (N.D.N.Y. 1914) (N.J. No. 3440), reprinted in OTIS H. GATES, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., DECISIONS OF COURTS IN CASES UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT 592, 593,
595 (1934) [hereinafter DECISIONS] (distinguishing between drugs and confections); Transcript of Jury Instructions, United States v. Am. Chicle Co., (D. Or. 1912) (N.J. No. 1939),
reprinted in DECISIONS, supra, at 365 (noting that pepsin chewing gum “must be either a
drug or a food”). But see, e.g., Savage v. Scovell, 171 F. 566 (E.D. Ky. 1908), reprinted in
DECISIONS, supra, at 18 (ruling that “an article may be a food and a medicine both”).
131
S. REP. NO. 493, at 2 (1934).
132
See Transcript of Jury Instructions, Four Boxes of Mulford’s Wintergreens, reprinted in
DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 592; Transcript of Jury Instructions, Am. Chicle Co., reprinted in
DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 362.
133
See, e.g., Soemnoform, Notice of Judgment No. 571 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Oct. 11, 1910); Blackburn’s Cascara, Wild Lemon, Castor Oil
Pills, Compound, Notice of Judgment No. 32 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., Nov. 30, 1908) (the only medicinal allusion was the name of the manufacturer:
“Victory Remedy Co.”); Concentrated Oil of Pine Compound, Notice of Judgment No. 30
(Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Nov. 28, 1908) (the only allusion to
medicinal use in the labeling was the name of the company: “The Globe Pharmaceutical
Co.”).
134
See, e.g., Gum Asafetida (Fœtida Ferula) 1 pound, Notice of Judgment No. 583 (Bd.
of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Aug. 27, 1908); 25 Boxes of 12 Bottles of
Bitters, Notice of Judgment No. 483 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
June 25, 1910).
135
Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of Health Claims in Food Labeling and Advertising, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 3, 5 (1986) (quoting 1907 BUREAU OF CHEMISTRY ANNUAL
REPORT 13–14) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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analysis probably reflects the fact that, from a practical perspective,
the categorization of a product was rarely significant under the 1906
Act; the Act subjected food and drugs to similar, overlapping regimes
of postmarket adulteration and misbranding enforcement.136 In
United States v. Four Boxes of Mulford’s Wintergreens,137 however, the definitional question was critical, and the opinion thus contains one of
the richest early discussions of how to classify a product on the
food–drug spectrum.
In Mulford’s, the United States seized wintergreen candies in a
cigar store, alleging they were adulterated because they contained
talc.138 Under the 1906 Act, the presence of talc automatically rendered confectionery—but not drugs—adulterated.139 Thus, in the
condemnation proceeding before the district court, the claimantmanufacturer contended that its product was a drug rather than a
confectionery. In court, the claimant asserted that wintergreen oil
“aided digestion.”140 Apparently, however, it had not made this claim
or any other disease-related claim in labeling or advertising.141 Significantly, the judge did not hold as a matter of law that the absence of
disease claims automatically rendered the mints a confectionary
rather than a drug. Instead, he held that the classification of the wintergreens was a question for the jury.142
In the jury instructions, the judge prohibited dual classification,
telling the jury members that if they found the article was a drug “you
should find that it is not a confection.”143 The judge implied that he
thought the weight of the evidence tended to show that the mints
were a confectionary product instead of a drug,144 but he did not focus on the absence of disease claims. Instead, he intimated that the
categorization of the mints depended primarily on the overall circumstances of their distribution and the inherent characteristics of the
136

See Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, §§ 7–8, 34 Stat. 768, 769–71 (1906) (repealed 1938).
Transcript of Jury Instructions, Four Boxes of Mulford’s Wintergreens, reprinted in DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 592.
138
Id. at 592–93.
139
Pure Food Act, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. at 769–70.
140
Transcript of Jury Instructions, Four Boxes of Mulford’s Wintergreens, reprinted in DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 594. Oil of wintergreen itself was a USP substance, but the judge
noted, “Of course as to these wintergreens, there is no pretense here that the particular
composition is recognized in the [USP].” Id.
141
See id. at 597–98 (noting that the manufacturer consistently referred to the wintergreens as “confectionaries” only).
142
Id. at 598 (“[Were the wintergreens] intended to be used . . . as a confection or as a
drug or a medicine? That is . . . for you[, the jury,] to decide.”).
143
Id. at 595; see also Transcript of Jury Instructions, United States v. Am. Chicle Co.,
(D. Or. 1912) (N.J. No. 1939), reprinted in DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 365 (stating that
pepsin chewing gum “must be either a drug or a food”).
144
See, e.g., Transcript of Jury Instructions, Four Boxes of Mulford’s Wintergreens, reprinted
in DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 595 (noting that one would need to eat five boxes of the
wintergreens to ingest a single medicinal dose of oil of wintergreen).
137
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product itself.145 With respect to the first factor, the judge observed:
“[I]f you should purchase a stick of peppermint candy in the candy
shop . . . you would hardly say that the stick of peppermint candy was a
drug.”146 With respect to the second factor, the judge conceded that
a candy intended to treat disease could be classified a drug even if it
contained “but a trifle of . . . essence or oil in it,”147 but he suggested
that the tiny amount of wintergreen oil in Mulford’s mints was important evidence that they were not, in fact, intended for use against disease.148 Finally, the judge pointed to the fact that the claimant had
stamped “Confectionery in tin” on shipping bills as possible evidence
of Mulford’s true intent.149 The jury ultimately determined that the
wintergreens were adulterated confectioneries.150
Labeling and promotional claims did provide important evidence
of intent in other cases decided soon after the passage of the 1906 Act.
Indeed, courts repeatedly classified food-like items as drugs solely because of such claims.151 For example, the Fifth Circuit did not hesitate to declare Robinson Springs Water a drug based on the disease
claims on its label.152 “‘[F]alse and fraudulent representations may
be made with respect to the curative affect of substances’ . . . and
when so made of water it seems to us it would be trifling to say that
water ordinarily is not a drug in the true meaning of the word.”153
Interestingly, however, some cases implied that even articles bearing
disease claims could sometimes be classified as “food” and not
“drugs.” For example, one court left it up to the jury to decide
whether Beeman’s Pepsin Chewing Gum, expressly labeled “A delicious remedy for all forms of indigestion,”154 was a food or a drug.155
Overall, courts were flexible and pragmatic regarding the role of la145

Id. at 595, 597–98.
Id. at 593.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 594–95.
149
Id. at 598.
150
Id. at 592 (“Verdict in favor of the United States.”).
151
See infra note 153 and cases cited therein.
152
See Bradley v. United States, 264 F. 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1920).
153
Id. at 81–82 (quoting Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 517 (1916)); see
also Eames’ Tonic Headache Wafers, Notice of Judgment No. 449 (Bd. of Food & Drug
Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., June 28, 1910) (crackers advertised as treatment for headaches); Cafe-Coca Compound, Notice of Judgment No. 235 (Bd. of Food & Drug Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Mar. 28, 1910) (syrup containing “healthful oils”); 10 Cases of
Baird-Daniel’s Co.’s Distilled Buchu Gin, Notice of Judgment No. 134 (Bd. of Food & Drug
Inspection, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Feb. 8, 1910) (gin advertised as “without an equal for
kidney and bladder troubles”).
154
Transcript of Jury Instructions, United States v. Am. Chicle Co., (D. Or. 1912) (N.J.
No. 1939), reprinted in DECISIONS, supra note 130, at 362.
155
Id. at 366 (“I think it must be a question of fact for you to determine from this
testimony whether this is a food or a drug.”).
146

R

R

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-5\CRN508.txt

1112

unknown

Seq: 22

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

12-JUN-08

13:37

[Vol. 93:1091

beling and promotional claims in product categorization under the
1906 Act.
III
THE 1938 FOOD, DRUG,

AND

COSMETIC ACT

A. “Food” and “Drug” in the 1938 Act
The definitions of “food” and “drug” in the 1934 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary, the first major revision since 1909,
reflected the impact of almost three decades of federal regulation as
well as scientific and cultural changes. Webster’s definition of “food”
still focused on its nutritive qualities, but, for the first time, the dictionary also alluded to its sensory characteristics.156 The definition
stated that “texture, consistency, digestibility, palatability, etc. . . . also
materially affect the value of food substances.”157 Notably, Webster’s
further referred to taste by paraphrasing the legal definition of “food”:
“As used in laws prohibiting adulteration, etc., food is generally held to
mean any article used as food or drink by man, whether simple,
mixed, or compound, including food adjuncts such as condiments, spice,
etc., and often excluding drugs and natural water.”158 The 1934 Webster’s dictionary embraced the legal meaning of “drug” even more directly.159 After briefly defining a drug as “[a]ny substance used as a
medicine, or in making medicines,” Webster’s quoted the entire definition of “drug” from the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act.160 The dictionary demoted the definition “any stuff used in dyeing or in
chemical operations” to an obsolete usage, a decision which may also
reflect the influence of the law on the common understanding of the
word “drug.”161 In short, by the time Congress began drafting what
would become the 1938 FD&C Act (1938 Act), the everyday meanings
of both “food” and “drug” seem to have shifted significantly.
The 1938 Act contained the definition of “food” that remains in
effect today: “(1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any
such article.”162 Congress expressly listed chewing gum so as to “elimi156
See WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 982 (2d
ed. 1934) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S 1934].
157
Id.
158
Id. (second emphasis added).
159
See id. at 791.
160
Id.
161
Id. (stating that the word drug “formerly” had this meaning). In addition, Webster’s noted for the first time an emerging special meaning for “drug”: “a narcotic substance or preparation.” Id. Funk & Wagnalls included “narcotic” as a colloquial meaning
for “drug” as early as 1897. FUNK & WAGNALLS, supra note 46, at 559.
162
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 201(f), 52 Stat. 1040, 1040 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2000)).
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nate[ ] any doubt as to whether or not [it is] food.”163 By contrast, a
1937 House bill omitted the terms “confectionery” and “condiment”
from the definition of food, without explanation, and these words
never appeared again.164 Apparently, the cultural conception of
“food” had evolved to the point that a product used primarily or exclusively for taste, rather than nutritive content, clearly fit within the
“food” category. Evidence for this development lies in a dramatic shift
in the ratio of instances in which food advertisers emphasized the
taste qualities of food as compared with those instances in which they
stressed food’s nutritive value and health benefits.165
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FIGURE 1

163
Hearing on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941 and S. 5 to Regulate Foods, Drugs, and
Cosmetics Before H. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 1
(1935) [hereinafter Hearing to Regulate Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics] (statement of Walter G.
Campbell, Chief of the FDA, Dep’t of Agric.), reprinted in 4 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 312, 370 (1979) [hereinafter FDA HISTORY].
164
H.R. 7913, 75th Cong. § 6 (1937).
165
This graph was constructed from the results of a ProQuest search. ProQuest search
of “Historical Newspapers,” “Display Ads” database (Sept. 13, 2007) (search terms: <(food
or drink or beverage or meal or snack or breakfast or lunch or dinner) w/5 (tast* or
flavor* or flavour* or delicious)> and <(food or drink or beverage or meal or snack or
breakfast or lunch or dinner) w/5 (nutr* or nourish* or health*)>).
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As the graph shows, during the decade in which Congress passed
the 1906 Act, newspaper advertisers boasted about the nutritive and
health qualities of food far more frequently than its taste. By the
1930s, however, advertisements associated food with flavor far more
frequently than with its nutritive and health value. This shift may have
been caused in part by the 1906 passage of the Pure Food and Drugs
Act, which prohibited food misbranding, and the 1914 enactment of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, which gave the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) the authority to prohibit false and deceptive advertising.166 Food companies, denied the ability to make bogus health
and disease claims, had to promote some feature of their products,
and taste was an obvious alternative.167 As advertisements increasingly
encouraged Americans to consider taste an important characteristic of
food, the cultural concept of food began to embrace condiments and
confectionery more clearly.
In drafting the 1938 Act’s definition of “drug,” Congress confronted the limits of its power to establish legal categories that were
inconsistent with extralegal cultural understandings. Bills introduced
by Senator Royal Copeland between 1933 and 1935 extended the
FDA’s authority to medical devices by including “devices” within the
definition of “drug.”168 Another senator caustically remarked: “[T]o
maintain that a purely mechanical device is a drug and to be treated
as a drug in law and in logic and in lexicography is a palpable absurdity. . . . [It] is the same thing as if the Congress of the United States
should attempt to say by law that calling a sheep’s tail a leg would
make it a leg.”169 Apparently persuaded by this reasoning, Copeland
soon afterward amended his bill to define “devices” separately from
“drugs.”170
Congress preserved, in slightly amended form, the provisions of
the 1906 Act’s drug definition that embraced articles recognized in
the official compendia and articles “intended for use in the diagnosis,
166
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 9 (“From its inception, the FTC regarded false or misleading labeling and advertising of food products as unfair methods of competition.”); see
also id. at 27 (“Unwarranted health claims for staple foods appear to have largely disappeared in the first decade under the 1906 Act.”).
167
Advertisers also stressed other qualities of food, particularly convenience, which
became one of the main bragging points in food advertising by the 1950s. HARVEY A.
LEVENSTEIN, PARADOX OF PLENTY: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF EATING IN MODERN AMERICA 101–09
(1993).
168
S. 5, 74th Cong. § 201(b)(2) (1st Sess. 1935), reprinted in 3 FDA HISTORY, supra
note 163, at 2; S. 2800, 73d Cong. § 2(b)(2) (2nd Sess. 1934), reprinted in 1 FDA HISTORY,
supra note 163, at 760; S. 1944, 73d Cong. § 2(b)(2) (1st Sess. 1933), reprinted in 1 FDA
HISTORY, supra note 163, at 2.
169
74 CONG. REC. S4841 (Apr. 2, 1935) (statement of Sen. J. Bennett Clark), reprinted
in 3 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 797.
170
S. 5, 74th Cong. (1st Sess. 1935) (as amended by S. Comm. on Commerce, May 13,
1935), reprinted in 4 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 109–10.
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cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals.”171 The 1938 Act, however, also added an important third
meaning to the definition of drug: “articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals.”172 The legislative history suggests that when inserting
the structure-function language, Congress did not have in mind the
dizzying variety of structure-function claims that now populate dietary
supplement labels. The only type of structure-function drug specifically mentioned in the legislative history was “slenderizing” products.173 Thus, it comes as no surprise that Congress exempted “food”
from the new category of structure-function drugs; it did not want to
convert every diet food into a drug. Moreover, as Peter Barton Hutt
has pointed out, the “food” exclusion probably reflected the fact that
“all food is intended to, and in fact does, affect the structure and function of the body.”174
Although the 1938 Act precluded the dual classification of a
product as a food and a structure-function drug, Congress clearly intended to allow the FDA to classify articles as foods and “disease”
drugs simultaneously.175 Walter G. Campbell, the FDA Chief, testified
in a 1934 hearing: “There are perhaps a hundred or more products

171
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 201(g)(2), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041
(1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2000)).
172
Id. § 201(g)(3), 52 Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C)). The
structure-function concept found its way into Webster’s in 1961, when the THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY—the first major revision since 1934—quoted the 1938 Act, rather
than the 1906 Act. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 695 (3d ed. 1961).
173
See Hearings on S. 2800 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong. 516 (2d Sess.
1934) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2800] (statement of Walter. G. Campbell, Chief of the
FDA, Dep’t of Agric.), reprinted in 2 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 519; S. REP. NO. 361, at
3 (1935), reprinted in 3 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 662; Hearing to Regulate Foods, Drugs,
and Cosmetics, supra note 163, at 55 (statement of Walter. G. Campbell, Chief of the FDA,
Dep’t of Agric.), reprinted in 4 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 370 (“The primary purpose
of that particular definition, which, admittedly, is inclusive, is to reach the use of fat reducers, particularly since obesity may not be a disease.”). Medical devices were also defined
with respect to structure-function effects, and the legislative history suggests that Congress
envisioned that devices might be intended to affect structure and function in ways other
than “slenderizing” the body. S. REP. NO. 361, at 3 (1935), reprinted in 3 FDA HISTORY,
supra note 163, at 662. One hearing witness mentioned, for example, nose-straightening
devices, scissors, and razors. See Hearings on S. 2800, supra at 318 (statement of Florence E.
Wall), reprinted in 2 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 321. The Chief of the FDA testified
that the definition of device should embrace “a great many products that are advocated for
changing the physical appearance of the person,” such as “heighteners.” Hearings on S.
2800, supra, at 516 (statement by Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the FDA, Dep’t of Agric.),
reprinted in 2 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 519.
174
Hutt, supra note 135, at 24.
175
S. REP. NO. 493, at 2 (1934) (calling specific authorization of dual classification
“superfluous,” since “there has never been a court decision to the effect that these definitions are mutually exclusive”).
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which have a dual [food and drug] use.”176 How, then, did Congress
intend for the agency to determine whether such a product was a
“food,” a “drug,” or both? In one of the most-quoted passages from
the legislative history of the 1938 Act, a Senate Report explained:
The use to which the product is to be put will determine the
category into which it will fall. If it is to be used only as a food it will
come within the definition of food and none other. If it contains
nutritive ingredients but is sold for drug use only, as clearly shown
by the labeling and advertising, it will come within the definition of
drug, but not that of food. If it is sold to be used both as a food and
for the prevention or treatment of disease it would satisfy both definitions and be subject to the substantive requirements for both.
The manufacturer of the article, through his representations in connection with its sale, can determine the use to which the article is to
be put.177

In a recent case regarding whether the FDA had regulatory authority over tobacco products, the parties starkly disagreed about the
precise significance of this passage.178 It is unclear what, if anything,
the paragraph says about situations in which the manufacturer has
made no representations regarding the use to which its product
should be put. A straightforward reading, however, suggests at least
that the manufacturer of a dual-use food-drug can, through representations it makes in labeling and advertising, control whether the product will be classified as a “food,” a “drug,” or both. This important
principle has eliminated much of the uncertainty about the categorization of such products.
The 1938 Act revised the misbranding standard for therapeutic
claims in a way that helped further differentiate food and drug labeling. The Pure Food and Drugs Act, as revised in 1912, had stated that
a drug was misbranded if its label contained a “false and fraudulent”
statement regarding “curative or therapeutic effect.”179 The requirement of demonstrating fraud made this a difficult standard for the
176
Hearings on S. 2800, supra note 173, at 515 (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief
of the FDA, Dep’t of Agric.), reprinted in 2 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 518.
177
S. REP. NO. 493, at 2–3.
178
Compare Brief for Respondent R.J. Reynolds at *12–14, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (No. 98-1152), 1999 WL 712566 (arguing that the
passage means that a product cannot be “intended to” be put to a certain use unless the
manufacturer suggests this use in representations made in connection with its sale), with
Reply Brief for Petitioners at *6–7 & n.3, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000) (No. 98-1152), 1999 WL 33609281 (arguing that the phrase “can determine” in the
passage means that the presence or absence of a manufacturer representation is not always
dispositive and that the question the passage addresses—whether a product concededly
subject to the Act constitutes a “food,” “drug,” or both—is a different question from
whether a product, like a cigarette, is subject to the Act in the first place).
179
Law of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 352, § 8, 37 Stat. 416, 417 (1912).
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FDA to satisfy.180 Although the agency had some success in enforcing
the Pure Food and Drugs Act’s misbranding provisions after 1912,181
disease claims did not disappear from food labels.182 The 1938 Act
relaxed the standard from “false and fraudulent” to “false or misleading in any particular,” a change that greatly eased the FDA’s burden in
proving misbranding.183 In part because of this revision, in the first
fifteen to twenty years following the passage of the 1938 Act, conventional food items rarely made claims about their effects on specific
diseases.184
The 1938 Act also introduced a requirement that the manufacturer of a “new drug” (defined as a drug not generally recognized as
safe185) submit to the FDA a New Drug Application (NDA) setting
forth the company’s evidence of the drug’s safety.186 The introduction of premarket drug review, in conjunction with other trends,
transformed the popular conception of the term “drug” dramatically.
After 1938, in the words of Philip J. Hilts, “the pharmaceutical industry went from a handful of chemical companies with no interest in
research and no medical staffs to a huge machine that discovered,
180
See Hearings on S. 1944 Before a S. Subcomm. on S. 1944, 73d Cong. 41–44 (2d Sess.
1933) (statement of Walter G. Campbell, Chief of the FDA, Dep’t of Agric.), reprinted in 1
FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 133–36 (describing the difficulties of bringing enforcement actions for false curative claims under the 1906 Act as amended).
181
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 472 (listing cases); see, e.g., Seven
Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 518–19 (1916) (holding that Eckman’s Alterative violated the 1906 Act because the product’s label stated that it would prevent pneumonia and
cure tuberculosis, and the manufacturer intended this statement to deceive purchasers).
182
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 13–14; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 152–54,
197–98 (providing examples of food manufacturers’ disease claims).
183
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 502(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1050
(1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000)). The 1938 Act also expanded FDA’s
power over disease claims for food by introducing a broad definition of “labeling” that
included any statements “accompanying” a product, not just those statements on the labels
themselves, and by requiring that omissions of material facts, as well as explicit representations, be taken into account when determining misbranding. Id. § 201(k), (m)–(n), 52
Stat. at 1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m)–(n)) .
184
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 27–28.
185
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 201(p)(1), 52 Stat. at 1041–42 (current
version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1)).
186
Id. § 505(b), 52 Stat. at 1052 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 352(b)). Unlike today,
the manufacturer did not have to wait for FDA approval before selling the drug; the right
to market automatically commenced sixty days after the manufacturer filed the NDA, unless the agency objected. Id. § 505(c), 52 Stat. at 1052 (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(c)). Also unlike today, the NDA did not have to establish the drug’s efficacy. See id.
§ 505(d), 52 Stat. at 1052 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)). The NDA requirement
was added in 1937, at the very end of the amendment process, in response to the deaths of
107 people, many of whom were children, from an adulterated elixir of sulfanilamide. See
S. Res 194, 75th Cong. (1937) (enacted), reprinted in 5 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 871;
S. REP. NO. 124, at 1–34 (1937), reprinted in 5 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 883–921.
The NDA obligation applied to few products that bridged the food–drug line, because
such articles were, for the most part, “generally recognized as safe” and thus not “new
drugs.” See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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developed, and marketed drugs of real use in treating disease.”187
This revolution stemmed in part from the pharmaceutical industry’s
recognition that it needed scientists and laboratories to comply with
the 1938 regulatory regime. These drastic changes were also impelled
by pre-World War II successes in laboratory-based drug synthesis and a
general faith in science inspired by the contributions of scientific researchers to the Allied war effort.188 Before this transformation, drug
companies were primarily distributors of natural vegetable and chemical substances that they merely put into usable dosage forms and combined into proprietary combinations; afterward, they were scientific
enterprises that sold new chemical entities synthesized in the laboratory.189 As Hilts observes: “More new and truly effective drugs were
invented between 1935 and 1955 than in all of previous human history. By the early 1950s, 90 percent of the prescriptions filled by patients were for drugs that did not even exist in 1938.”190
In sum, after the enactment of the 1938 Act, the drug market was
increasingly dominated by precisely characterized new chemical entities manufactured under carefully controlled conditions.191 This
transformation of the pharmaceutical industry inevitably affected the
public’s notion of the prototypical “drug,” pulling the common understanding of the term further and further away from the nineteenth
century’s paradigmatic “drug simple” derived from vegetable matter.192 The blurry line between “food” and “drug” became more defined. The border between the categories became even more distinct
in 1951, when the Durham-Humphrey Amendments to the FD&C Act
gave the FDA another power over drugs that it did not have over food:
the authority to mandate prescription status.193

187

PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNYEARS OF REGULATION 95 (2003).
188
See id. at 93–94, 104.
189
See id. at 93 (“[The 1938 Act] came at a time when the drug industry was just beginning to realize that the nature of its business in the future was not to stamp out millions of
identical bottles of chemicals, but rather to fashion drugs that could attack the underlying
bases of disease. . . . The 1938 law made it clear that companies could not survive without
scientists and laboratories.”).
190
Id. at 105.
191
See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
192
See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
193
Durham-Humphrey Amendment, ch. 578, § 503(b)(1), 65 Stat. 648, 648 (1951)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 353–355 (2000)). See generally Charles Wesley Dunn, The
New Prescription Drug Law: Enacted by the Durham Bill (H. R. 3298) as a Part of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 951 (1951) (describing three parts of the
Durham-Humphrey Amendment). Even before 1951, the FDA had effectively established
mandatory prescription status through regulation. See Edward B. Williams, Exemption from
the Requirement of Adequate Directions for Use in the Labeling of Drugs, 2 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.Q.
155, 159 (1947).
DRED
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B. The Story of Vitamin Pills Under the 1938 Regime
Beginning in 1911, scientists isolated and identified a series of
substances they called “vitamins” and explored the association between vitamin deficiencies and disease.194 By the 1920s, American
food advertisers were liberally proclaiming that their vitamin- and
mineral-rich products would promote health, growth, and longevity.195 The middle class acquired a widespread vitamin consciousness
that soon flowered into “vitamin-mania.”196 Until scientists developed
methods for commercially synthesizing vitamins in the 1930s, however, only manufacturers of conventional food (and products like
yeast tablets and cod-liver oil) could exploit the vitamin craze.197
Pharmaceutical companies began using irradiation to produce vitamin D supplements in the early 1930s.198 In the mid-1930s, further
advancements in commercial synthesis allowed manufacturers to mass
produce other vitamins in liquid, tablet, and capsule form.199 By
1938, vitamin supplements were the second most popular items on
drugstore shelves, following only laxatives.200
A 1935 Senate bill added a provision to the proposed “Federal
Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act” declaring any food to be misbranded
“[i]f it purports to be or is represented for special dietary uses, such as
by infants or invalids or for other nutritional requirements, and its
label fails to bear, if so required by regulations . . . statements concerning its vitamin, mineral, and other dietary properties which fully
inform the purchaser as to its nutritional value.”201 The accompanying report explained that this provision dealt with articles “such as
infant foods, invalid foods, slenderizing foods, and other dietary products intended for special nutritional requirements.”202 The failure of
the 1935 bill to specifically mention vitamin supplements is hardly surprising, for the commercial synthesis of vitamins was just starting to
become practicable at that time.203
Vitamin capsules and tablets were extremely popular by the time
the Act passed in 1938, but the “special dietary foods” provision as
enacted in section 403(j) still did not refer directly to vitamin supplements.204 Congress thus failed to resolve an important definitional
194

See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 148.
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 13; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 149–50, 152–53.
196
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 12–14; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 147–60.
197
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 12–16.
198
Id. at 19.
199
See id. at 19–20.
200
See id. at 20.
201
S. 5, 74th Cong. §302(j) (1935), reprinted in 3 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 1, 8.
202
S. REP. NO. 361, at 12 (1935), reprinted in 3 FDA HISTORY, supra note 163, at 671.
203
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 19; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 148–49.
204
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 403(j), 52 Stat. 1040, 1048 (1938)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 343(j) (2000)).
195

R
R
R
R

R
R
R

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-5\CRN508.txt

1120

unknown

Seq: 30

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

12-JUN-08

13:37

[Vol. 93:1091

question: Were vitamin pills “food” or “drugs”? The fact that vitamins
are nutritive substances found naturally in foods tugged vitamin supplements strongly toward the “food” category. In the marketing battle
that arose between conventional food processors and vitamin supplement manufacturers, however, the former fought fiercely to distinguish vitamin supplements from food (“Get your vitamins in food—
it’s the thriftier way”205).
The fact that vitamin pills differed significantly from prototypical
foods bolstered the food industry’s efforts to differentiate vitamin supplements from conventional food products. Vitamins failed two of the
four attributes in the “cluster model” of food that I set forth earlier;
they were swallowed and used for nutritive value, but they were not—
in the days before children’s chewable vitamins—chewed or used for
taste.206 Moreover, vitamins did not fall within the triad of complex
organic substances—proteins, carbohydrates, and fats—that had long
been deemed to be the sole building blocks of food.207 Webster’s
1934 definition of “food” referred to these three substances and then
stated that vitamins (along with water and salts) were “not ordinarily
classed as foods.”208
Finally, another likely reason why vitamin pills did not fit comfortably within the “food” category was the fact that they shared multiple
attributes with prototypical drugs. Vitamin supplements were marketed in drug-like dosage forms and in drug-like packaging. They
were widely discussed and advertised as preventing all manners of ailments. Moreover, in the 1930s, they were manufactured primarily by
pharmaceutical companies and sold largely—in some states exclusively—through drugstores, frequently by prescription.209 As scholars
have stressed, the presence of contrasting categories may constitute a
critical aspect of a system of categorization.210 In this instance, the
very existence of the contrasting cultural category “drug” may have
limited the range of items embraced by the category “food.” Many

205

LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 20.
See supra text accompanying note 29, Parts II.A, III.A; infra Part IV. The earliest
advertisement I could find for chewable vitamins was published in 1957. WASH. POST, Apr.
11, 1957, at D13 (containing an advertisement promoting a “candy flavored, chewable multiple vitamin”).
207
See WEBSTER’S 1934, supra note 156, at 982.
208
Id.
209
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 14; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 148–55.
210
LAKOFF, supra note 14, at 50–52. For example, as Lakoff points out, within the
“superordinate category of things-to-sit-on,” the range of objects covered by the basic-level
category “chair” would almost certainly be different if the contrasting categories “stool,”
“sofa,” and “bench” did not exist. Id. at 52.
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people seem initially to have placed vitamin pills into the former conceptual box rather than the latter.211
The drugstore monopoly over vitamin retailing in some states
emerged because drugstore lobbyists persuaded state legislatures to
classify vitamin supplements as drugs, thereby restricting the sale of
vitamin supplements to pharmacies.212 Grocery stores and department stores hoping to profit from the vitamin boom were thus the
first litigants to advance the argument that vitamin pills were food.
For example, in 1939, the Kroger Grocery chain challenged an Indiana Board of Pharmacy rule limiting vitamin sales to drugstores.213
The Superior Court ruled in favor of Kroger, holding that vitamins
are “accessory food factors,”214 and the Appellate Court upheld this
decision.215 In an impassioned dissent to a denial of rehearing, one
judge pointed out that the vitamins in question “were made synthetically by pharmaceutical manufacturers, and never were part of any
food or edible thing.”216 Even if they were derived from food, he
pointed out, “[t]he books abound in the instances wherein those substances, which we always refer to as drugs . . . are obtained from substances commonly used as food.”217 This was a dissent, however.
In 1940, the FDA promulgated proposed regulations pursuant to
section 403(j) that required, among other things, “minimum daily requirement” labeling on food purporting to have a “special dietary
use . . . based in whole or in part on its vitamin [or mineral] prop-

211
See, e.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.,
concurring) (reluctantly agreeing that the manufacturer of V-8 vitamin tablets infringed
the trademark of V-8 vegetable juice, but noting, “I know that I, for one, would never think
that defendant’s tablets, sold in drug-stores, are the product of the manufacturer of ‘V-8’
vegetable-juice, sold in food-stores and restaurants”).
212
See id. at 20.
213
Dep’t of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 40 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ind. App.
1942).
214
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Dep’t of State, Marion County Sup. Ct., IN, quoted
in Public Hearing on Food for Special Dietary Uses Transcript, 57–58 (Oct. 7, 1940) [hereinafter
Hearing on Special Dietary Uses] (on file with author).
215
See Kroger, 40 N.E.2d at 375; see also King v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 151 P.2d 282,
286 (Cal. Dist. App. 1944) (holding that a “drugless practitioner” who was not authorized
to prescribe drugs did not violate his license by prescribing mineral and vitamin capsules);
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Quackenbush & Co., 39 A.2d 28 (N.J., Ct. Comm. Pleas Passaic County
1940) (dismissing the complaint against defendant department store operator because vitamins are considered “essentially a food product”); cf. Cowdery v. Shafer, 58 Pa. D. & C.
290, 299 (Pa., Ct. Comm. Pleas Dauphin County 1946) (holding that the license of a
“drugless practitioner” was properly revoked because he dispensed herb and vegetable capsules for the purpose of treating, curing, or mitigating disease).
216
Dep’t of State v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 41 N.E.2d 952, 952 (Ind. App. 1942)
(Stevenson, J., dissenting).
217
Id. at 953.
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erty.”218 Whether this rule applied to vitamin supplements as well as
conventional foods was unclear, because the rule did not address
whether supplements were “food” in the first place. All the other labeling regulations in the proposed rule applied to products in conventional food form, such as infant food, weight-control food, and
hypoallergenic food.219
At the ensuing public hearings, the Kroger Grocery Company
contended that the FDA should categorize vitamin supplements as
food so as to promote their sale and consumption, particularly among
lower-income groups.220 If the FDA treated vitamin supplements as
drugs, Kroger warned, state boards of pharmacy would, as in Indiana,
pass restrictive regulations limiting the sale of vitamins to pharmacies,
which had higher prices and were less plentiful than grocery stores.221
Kroger then observed:
Milk and orange juice may be specifically prescribed in the treatment of a definite disease. Beef steak may be used to heal a black
eye. In these cases foods function as medicines, but no one could
seriously contend that they are generally drugs. . . . The occasional
use of vitamins to cure disease does not alter the inherent dietary
character of vitamin concentrates.222

In response, the National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD)
did not take as extreme a position as Kroger seemed to anticipate.
NARD conceded that not all vitamin products and preparations
should be treated as drugs, but argued that if a vitamin’s labeling
mentioned ailments and diseases, “the question . . . is automatically
determined by the language of Section 201(g) of the Federal Act.”223
A representative of the U.S. Vitamin Corporation contended that vitamin tablets, capsules, elixirs, and concentrates, “as against commonly
accepted foods, fortified with vitamins,” might be food, drugs, or cos-

218
In the Matter of Prescription Label Statements Concerning Dietary Properties of
Food Purporting to Be or Represented for Special Dietary Uses: Notice of Public Hearing,
5 Fed. Reg. 3565, 3565 (Sept. 5, 1940).
219
See id. at 3565–66.
220
Hearing on Special Dietary Uses, supra note 214, at 53–54 (statement of Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.). This argument had added weight at that time, just before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, because experts were concerned that widespread malnutrition would
weaken the United States in its looming conflict with the fascist powers. See LEVENSTEIN,
supra note 167, at 64–68 (discussing the perception of widespread vitamin deficiencies in
the early 1940s).
221
Hearing on Special Dietary Uses, supra note 214, at 54–56 (statement of Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.).
222
Id. at 60; see also id. at 204 (statement of Madeline Ross, Consumer’s Union of U.S.,
Inc.) (stating that vitamin and mineral supplements “are part of the diet, and are dietary
foods in the true sense of the words”).
223
Id. at 115 (statement Mr. Jones, National Association of Retail Druggists).
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metics, “depending on the composition of the product, the purpose
for which it is used, and its labeling.”224
The 1941 final rule, mandating “recommended daily allowance”
labeling of vitamin and mineral content, still did not explicitly cover
supplements.225 Nonetheless, it strongly implied that such products
were special dietary foods by defining “special dietary uses” to include
“[u]ses for supplementing or fortifying the ordinary or usual diet with
any vitamin, mineral or other dietary property.”226 Some residual confusion about the status of vitamin supplements existed as late as 1943,
when a federal district court held that vitamin capsules were drugs,
and not food, because they were listed and recognized in the U.S.
Pharmacopoeia.227 Nonetheless, from the mid-1940s on, both the
FDA and the courts treated vitamin pills as food for special dietary
uses, or, if their labeling bore disease claims, as both drugs and food
for special dietary uses.228 In 1973, the agency—over the objections of
some comments—finally formally stated in a regulation that the term
“food for special dietary use” embraced vitamins in supplement
form.229
In 1986, former FDA Chief Counsel William Goodrich recalled
that the agency’s decision in the early 1940s to treat vitamin supplements as food was based on nothing more than the “idea that they
could deal with them better . . . as special dietary foods than they
could as drug items, because the agency really didn’t have much experience with drugs at that time.”230 The decision also, however, seemed
to reflect an American cultural tendency to view food largely in terms

224

Id. at 116–17 (statement of H.E. Dubin, U.S. Vitamin Corp.).
See Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
6 Fed. Reg. 5921, 5921 (Nov. 22, 1941) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2.10a); LEVENSTEIN, supra
note 167, at 65–66 (describing the implementation of “recommended daily allowance”
standards).
226
Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6
Fed. Reg. at 5921.
227
See United States v. Harold Hain (S.D. Cal. 1943), reprinted in VINCENT A. KLEINFELD
& CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 1938–1949, at 265, 266–67 (Food Law Institute Series No. 2, 1949).
228
See V. E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d 34, 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1957) (holding the
supplement product was a “food for special dietary use” by virtue of its labeling indicating
the presence of vitamins and minerals, and a drug, by virtue of its disease claims).
229
See 21 C.F.R. § 125.1(a) (1973); Special Dietary Foods, 38 Fed. Reg. 2143, 2149
(Jan. 19, 1973) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 125); Label Statements; Findings of Fact,
Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,708, 20,717 (Aug. 2, 1973) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 125).
230
Interview by Ronald T. Ottes & Fred L. Lofsvold with William W. Goodrich, Office
of the General Counsel, FDA, in Rockville. Md. (Oct. 15, 1986), http://www.fda.gov/oc/
history/oralhistories/goodrich/default.htm [hereinafter Goodrich Interview].
225
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of its functional value.231 The categorization of tasteless synthetic capsules as foodstuffs seems emblematic of the longstanding ethos among
the country’s elites and experts that people should “eat to live,” not
“live to eat.”232
Interestingly, from a regulatory perspective, not much was at
stake in the classification of vitamin pills as “food” or “drugs” in the
1940s. Even if categorized as the latter, vitamin supplements were
generally recognized as safe and thus would not be “new drugs” subject to the NDA requirement.233 Goodrich recalled that the main significance of the classification decision was the content of the label;
food labels declared all their ingredients, whereas drug labels included only active ingredients.234 The FDA later grew to regret the
fact that vitamin pills were labeled according to food regulations, because it believed that vitamin manufacturers added ingredients with
no nutritional value to their products, simply so that they could falsely
suggest improved utility by listing these ingredients on the label.235
This problem led Goodrich to conclude, “[W]e probably made a mistake in terms of classifying the vitamins as foods.”236
Not until the late 1960s and 1970s, however, did it become obvious how significantly the categorization of vitamin and mineral supplements as food handcuffed the agency. In the early 1960s, the FDA
launched a campaign against “health quackery,” focusing largely on
explicit disease claims for vitamin products.237 Initially, the agency
appeared to have the legal weapons it needed to conduct this war.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the FDA had successfully contended
that vitamin supplements making disease claims were misbranded
drugs,238 and the agency continued to prevail with this approach dur231
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 64–70 (discussing efforts by the government to
shape the American diet to bolster the war effort in the 1940s); supra notes 69–77 and
accompanying text.
232
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 79.
233
See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
234
Goodrich Interview, supra note 230.
235
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 57–69. The Vitamin-Mineral Amendments of 1976 prohibit the FDA from limiting the composition of vitamin-mineral supplements or declaring
such a product misbranded because its label bears a complete ingredient listing. VitaminMineral Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 411(a)(1)(c), (b)(1), 90 Stat. 410, 410 (1976)
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 350(a)(1)(C), (b)(1) (2000)).
236
Goodrich Interview, supra note 230.
237
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 167–68; Hutt, supra note 135, at 54–55.
238
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 52–54. For two prominent examples of seizures of
vitamin and mineral products as misbranded drugs, see Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S.
345 (1948); United States v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 1951), reprinted in VINCENT A. KLEINFELD & CHARLES WESLEY DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT:
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 1951–1952, at 204–13 (Food Law Institute Series No.
4, 1953).
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ing the 1960s.239 In 1973, after a protracted eleven-year process, the
FDA further attacked the problem of “quack” vitamin and mineral
claims by amending the 1941 special dietary foods regulation. The
revised regulation stated explicitly that, in most instances, a product
was misbranded if its labeling “represent[ed], suggest[ed], or implie[d]” that “the food, because of the presence or absence of certain
vitamins and/or minerals, is adequate or effective in the prevention,
cure, mitigation, or treatment of any disease or symptom.”240 In addition, in the preamble to the revised regulation, the FDA asserted that
“explicit claims related to prevention or treatment of specific disease
conditions render a [vitamin-mineral] product a drug.”241
None of these initiatives addressed another problem, however.
During the 1960s, a phenomenon that the FDA dubbed “nutritional
mythology”242 so permeated American culture243 that labeling claims
became almost irrelevant. Celebrity health food advocate Adelle Davis, in her bestselling books and television talk-show appearances, promoted the use of vitamin and mineral supplements as a weapon
against disease.244 Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling endorsed the
consumption of large doses of vitamin C as a treatment for the common cold and helped trigger a megavitamin craze, in which people
attempted to cure a wide variety of ailments by gulping down massive
doses of vitamins.245 In this environment, supplement manufacturers
did not need to make explicit disease claims themselves.
In the early 1970s, the FDA concocted a plan to apply the drug
regulatory regime to at least some vitamin and mineral supplements
that did not make disease claims. Regulating such products as drugs,
instead of food, would allow the agency to impose more elaborate labeling requirements on them (including “adequate directions for
239
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 55 n.333; see also United States v. Vitasafe Formula M,
226 F. Supp. 266, 278 (D.N.J. 1964) (holding that a vitamin and mineral capsule was both a
food and a drug; a “food” “because its labeling recommends its use as and represents it to
be of value as a dietary and nutritional supplement” and a “drug” “because its labeling
recommends its use as and represents it to be of value as a curative or preventive of disease
conditions”).
240
Label Statements; Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg.
20,708, 20,718 (Aug. 2, 1973) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 125).
241
Id. at 20,710. Moreover, the FDA prohibited the combination of vitamins or minerals with “[i]ngredients or products . . . which have not been shown to be essential to
human nutrition.” Id. at 20,718.
242
K. L. Milstead, Deputy Dir., Bureau of Enforcement, FDA, Address Before the Yonkers Academy of Medicine: Recent Developments in the Food and Drug Administration’s
Program Against Nutritional Nonsense 4 (Oct. 9, 1962) (transcript available from the National Library of Medicine) (drawing attention to the “problem [of] a vast and growing
‘folklore’ or ‘mythology’ of nutrition”) (quoting George Larrick, FDA Comm’r, Address
Before Congress on Medical Quackery (Oct. 1961)).
243
Id. at 4–6 (discussing tactics and giving examples of “nutritional quacks”).
244
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 164–65.
245
Id. at 166.
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use”);246 limit them to prescription sale; or even to require the manufacturers, under the 1962 FD&C Act drug amendments,247 to file
premarket NDAs demonstrating both safety and effectiveness.248 In
1973, the FDA issued a rule declaring that “[a]ny product containing
more than the upper limit [150 percent249] of the U.S. RDA per serving . . . of a vitamin or mineral . . . is a drug.”250 The agency explained
that because there was “no known food or nutrition use of nutrients at
such high levels,” such products were “in fact articles intended for use
in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man”
and thus fell within the drug definition.251 Moreover, on the same
day, the FDA issued twin rules stating that because of toxicity, oral
preparations containing more than 10,000 International Units (IU) of
vitamin A or more than 400 IU of vitamin D “are drugs subject to
section 503(b)(1) of the [FD&C Act] and shall be restricted to prescription sale.”252
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the FDA’s approach. In National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v.
FDA,253 the court overturned the rule categorizing vitamin-mineral
preparations exceeding 150 percent of the RDA as drugs.254 It observed that a significant number of people, including women taking
oral contraceptives, have “indisputable nutritional needs for potencies
exceeding the upper limits.”255 Consequently, the court maintained,
“it cannot be said even as an objective matter that a given bottle of
pills, each containing more than the upper limit of one or more nutrients, is not being used for nutritional purposes.”256 While acknowledging that “a factfinder should be free to pierce all of a
manufacturer’s subjective claims of intent . . . to find actual therapeutic intent on the basis of objective evidence in a proper case, such
objective evidence would need to consist of something more than
demonstrated uselessness as a food for most people.”257
246

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(f), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2000).
See infra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
248
See Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 788 (2d Cir. 1974) (listing
the added powers FDA would have over vitamin supplements if they were categorized as
drugs).
249
See id. at 790.
250
Label Statements; Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Final Order, 38 Fed. Reg.
20,708, 20,717–18 (Aug. 2, 1973) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 125).
251
Id. at 20,710.
252
Id. at 20,723, 20,725.
253
504 F.2d 761.
254
Id. at 789.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
247
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Three years later, in National Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews,258
the same court struck down the FDA regulation imposing prescription
drug status on high dose vitamin A and D supplements.259 The Second Circuit acknowledged that the agency, in determining the “intended use” of a product, could look not only at labeling, promotional
material, and advertising, but also to “any other relevant source.”260
In rejecting the rule, however, the Second Circuit made clear that the
agency would have to clear a very high evidentiary bar to support a
determination that a vitamin product marketed without disease claims
was a drug. In a much-quoted passage, Mathews indicated that the
FDA could categorize high-dose vitamin A and D preparations as
drugs only if it provided evidence that they had no recognized nutritional use and were used “almost exclusively for therapeutic
purposes.”261
In these two decisions, the Second Circuit thus made it almost
impossible for the FDA, in the absence of disease claims, to categorize
a vitamin-mineral supplement as a drug “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.”262 Late
in the process of defending its regulations, the FDA also advanced an
alternative theory, based on the official compendia provision of the
drug definition.263 The agency contended that vitamins and minerals
were drugs under this provision merely by virtue of being listed in the
U.S. Pharmacopoeia and the National Formulary.264 This theory had
worked for the FDA on several previous occasions,265 but in both of
the Second Circuit cases, the court rebuffed this argument as an unacceptable post-hoc rationalization for the agency’s actions.266 The
court further stated that the FDA’s vitamin-mineral regulations were
presumptively arbitrary if justified solely by this component of the
258

557 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 337–38.
260
Id. at 334 (quoting United States v. An Article . . . Consisting of 216 Cartoned
Bottles . . . “Sudden Change,” 409 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1969)).
261
Id. at 334 (quoting Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 703
(2d Cir. 1975)).
262
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(g)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)
(2000).
263
See id. § 201(g)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(A).
264
See Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d at 788–89 (addressing the FDA’s
contention that “all the vitamins and presumably all the minerals with which we are here
concerned are recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia or the official National Formulary”).
265
See Harold Hain, supra note 227, at 267; see also United States v. 39 Cases of . . .
Korleen Tablets, 192 F. Supp. 51, 51–52 (E.D. Mich. 1961); United States v. Beuthanasia-D
Regular, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 38,265, at 9-24-81 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding
that an animal euthanasia substance is a drug and reasoning that “the [USP’s] recognition
of the two active ingredients in the seized articles as drugs [is] decisive”).
266
See Mathews, 557 F.2d at 337; Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761,
788–89 (2d Cir. 1974).
259
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drug definition, because the agency had articulated no intelligible
principle for treating some USP- and NF-listed products as drugs, but
not others.267
The Second Circuit thus eliminated almost any uncertainty about
the classification of vitamin pills; if the manufacturer did not represent them as curing, treating, or preventing disease, they were
“food” and not “drugs.” Moreover, before Mathews, Congress had also
acted to limit the FDA’s power over vitamin-mineral products. The
Vitamin-Mineral Amendments of 1976268 provided, among other
things, that the agency “may not classify any natural or synthetic vitamin or mineral (or combination thereof) as a drug solely because it
exceeds the level of potency which [the FDA] determines is nutritionally rational or useful.”269 Hence, by the end of the 1970s, no vitamin
supplement without disease claims could be legally categorized as a
“drug.”270
Yet, from a cultural perspective, have vitamin pills ever simply
been “food”? The law has always seemed to acknowledge their ambiguous status by giving them a special classification within the broader
food category—first “foods for special dietary uses,” now “dietary supplements.”271 Meanwhile, the subcategory “foods for special dietary
uses” continues to offer a legal harbor for other types of products that
exist in the netherworld between food and drugs, including products
with “[u]ses for supplying particular dietary needs which exist by rea267
See Mathews, 557 F.2d at 336–38; Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n, 504 F.2d at 788–89; cf.
United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660, 665 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d
without op., 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976) (explaining that the official compendia provision
of the drug definition “cannot be taken literally,” because a literal interpretation would
“run[ ] afoul of the principle that a legislative body may not lawfully delegate its functions
to a private citizen or organization”).
268
Vitamin and Mineral Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94–278, 90 Stat. 410 (1976) (current version in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)).
269
Id. § 411(a)(1)(B), 90 Stat. at 410 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 350(a)(1)(B)).
The amendment also prohibited the agency, under its food misbranding and food standards authority, from establishing limits on the potency of vitamins and minerals, and from
limiting the permissible combinations of vitamins, minerals, and other food ingredients in
such products. Id. § 411(a)(1)(A), (C), 90 Stat. at 410 (current version at 21 U.S.C.
§ 350(a)(1)(A), (C)). In 1979, the FDA revoked its various vitamin-mineral regulations.
Food for Special Dietary Use: Vitamin and Mineral Products; Revocation of Regulations, 44
Fed. Reg. 16,005 (Mar. 16, 1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 101, 105, 201).
270
Although the FDA, as part of its Over-the-Counter Drug Review, proposed to regulate vitamin and mineral products above RDA-potency with certain claims as over-thecounter drugs, the FDA withdrew this effort under political pressure in 1981. Vitamin and
Mineral Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Withdrawal of Proposed Monograph, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,914, 57,914–15 (Nov. 27, 1981) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt 345); see
Hutt, supra note 135, at 64. Some vitamin products are still marketed as prescription
drugs. See, e.g., CMS Policy Reversal Gives Part D Plans the OK to Cover Rx Niacin, FDA WEEK,
Apr. 21, 2006, at 12, available at http://www.InsideHealthPolicy.com (allowing insurance
coverage of prescription niacin).
271
See infra Part V.B.
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son of a physical, physiological, pathological or other condition, including but not limited to the conditions of diseases.”272 Moreover,
the 1983 Orphan Drug Act, reflecting a decade of FDA practice, established a category called “medical foods,” which are foods “formulated
to be consumed or administered enterally under the supervision of a
physician and which [are] intended for the specific dietary management of a disease or condition for which distinctive nutritional requirements . . . are established by medical evaluation.”273 In all these
ways, federal food and drug law has implicitly acknowledged the absence of a firm line between “food” and “drug.”

THE 1962 DRUG

IV
AMENDMENTS: THE IMPACT
EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW

OF

PREMARKET

Under the 1938 premarket review process for drugs, an NDA filer
did not have to wait for positive approval from the FDA; the applicant
could commence marketing sixty days after filing if the agency did not
object prior to that date.274 Congress imposed a true premarket approval system on food additives before it imposed one on drugs. The
1958 Food Additives Amendment, still in effect today, decreed that
the use of any “food additive”—defined to exclude substances generally recognized as safe—renders a food adulterated unless the use
complies with an FDA food additive regulation.275 The Amendment
also established a procedure for petitioning the agency to issue such a
regulation. The legislative history explained that the agency should
approve a food additive petition only if the petitioner demonstrates,
through the presentation of scientific evidence, “a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from the proposed use of an
additive.”276
Four years later, the procedural burdens imposed on new drugs
leapfrogged over those applicable to food additives. The 1962
Kefauver Drug Amendments significantly enhanced the FDA’s power
over drugs, and it imposed new requirements on the drug industry
that dramatically increased the cost of drug development. The
272
21 C.F.R. § 105.3(a)(1)(i) (2007). The only special dietary food label regulations
currently in effect concern hypoallergenic foods, infant foods, and weight-reduction foods.
Id. § 105.3(a)(1)(i)(B).
273
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 529ee(b)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(3)
(2000); see also Hutt, supra note 135, at 70–71 (describing the agency’s special regulation of
medical foods in the early 1970s); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(8) (defining medical foods).
274
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052
(1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)–(c) (2000)).
275
Food Additives Amendment, Pub. L. No. 85-929, §§ 2, 4, 72 Stat. 1784, 1784,
1785–88 (1958) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 348 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
276
S. REP. NO. 85-2422, at 6 (1958).
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Amendments introduced the present system of premarket review,
under which it is illegal to market a new drug prior to receiving positive FDA approval of an NDA.277 In addition, the 1962 law redefined
“new drug” to include any product not generally recognized as safe or
effective and thus launched the requirement that new drug manufacturers demonstrate effectiveness, as well as safety, prior to marketing.278 The Amendments established a “substantial evidence”
standard for effectiveness, which could ordinarily be satisfied only by
“adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by [qualified] experts.”279
The Kefauver Amendments made it effectively impossible for any
conventional food—or, for that matter, any natural product—to make
a disease claim legally. Prior to 1962, the FDA could only regulate
such claims reactively; that is, the agency had to allege that a product
in commerce was misbranded and then carry the burden in court of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim in
question was not scientifically supportable.280 Under the 1962 drug
amendments, almost any food making a disease claim was not only
misbranded, but was also an unapproved, and thus illegally marketed,
new drug.281 To avoid this status, a food manufacturer making a disease claim would have to obtain prior FDA approval of an NDA setting
forth “substantial evidence” of effectiveness. As a practical matter, virtually no food producer would start down this route, because most
foods lacked patent protection. Without such protection, a manufacturer would never recover the significant costs of clinical testing and
NDA preparation even if the application were ultimately approved.
Moreover, the often prolonged time it took the FDA to approve an
NDA was simply incompatible with food marketing.282

277
See Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c)–(e), 76 Stat. 780, 781
(1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)).
278
Id. § 102(a)(1), 76 Stat. at 781 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1)); see
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, BENEFIT VS. RISK: HOW CDER APPROVES
NEW DRUGS 5, available at http://www.policyalmanac.org/health/archive/How%20CDER
%20Approves%20New%20Drugs.pdf.
279
§ 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(7)).
280
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act §§ 302, 304, 502(a), 21 U.S.C. §§ 332,
334, 352(a) (2000).
281
A food making such a claim would avoid the definition of “new drug,” and thus the
NDA requirement, only if it fell within a grandfather clause or if the food was “generally
recognized . . . as safe and effective” for the labeled purpose. See id. § 102(a), 76 Stat. at
781 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §321(p)(1)).
282
E-mail from Peter Barton Hutt, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP, to author (Sept. 11, 2007) (on file with author); E-mail from Eugene I. Lambert, Senior Counsel, Covington & Burling LLP, to author (Sept. 10, 2007) (on file with author).
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As a legal matter, dual food-drug classification survived the
Kefauver Amendments283 and, indeed, continues today.284 Since
1962, however, dual food-drug products have existed almost exclusively in the world of legal concepts, not in the marketplace. To say
that an article is both a food and drug under the current regulatory
regime usually means that it is both a food and an unapproved new
drug—that is, an illegal drug.
Between 1962 and the mid-1980s, the FDA used its new powers to
attack foods that made explicit or implied disease claims.285 Throughout this period, the agency steadfastly clung to the position that any
conventional food making a claim with respect to a particular disease
was a new drug, unless it was a special dietary food complying with
section 403(j) regulations.286 The FDA also fought against disease
claims made by distributors of products such as herbs, botanicals, and
food-derived substances.287 As was true for conventional foods, an
agency declaration that an herbal supplement or similar product was a
new drug effectively constituted a market ban—without patent protection, nobody had adequate incentives to undertake the costly and uncertain new drug approval process.288
Distributors of some nonconventional food substances made
structure-function claims, rather than disease claims, attempting to
avoid drug classification by asserting eligibility for the parenthetical
“other than food” exception in the structure-function drug definition.289 This strategy provoked a legal battle over exactly what constituted a “food.” The main contest concerned the regulatory status of
“starch blockers,” which were tablets and capsules containing a protein extracted from raw kidney beans. Manufacturers of these products claimed they controlled weight by inhibiting the human body’s
digestion of starch.290 In 1982, after the FDA sought to remove starch
blockers from the market by classifying them as unapproved new
drugs, the manufacturers sought a declaratory judgment rejecting the
283
See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 1976) (“[E]ven
if a substance is also a food it may be subjected to [regulation as a drug] if it is used in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals.”);
Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn. 1976) (“[P]laintiff’s argument that
laetrile is a . . . food does not preclude its being a drug . . . .”).
284
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 33–34.
285
See generally Hutt, supra note 135, at 26–73 (discussing the FDA’s implementation of
the 1938 Act with respect to health claims).
286
Id. at 42–48, 65–66.
287
See Milstead, supra note 242, at 1–14.
288
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p)(1), 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1), 355
(2000) (requiring the manufacturer of a “new drug” to demonstrate both safety and effectiveness prior to marketing).
289
Id. § 201(g)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C).
290
Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 335–36 (7th Cir. 1983).
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agency’s conclusion.291 The manufacturers contended that starch
blockers were “food,” and thus within the parenthetical exclusion
from the drug definition,292 because they were derived from beans,
and also because they were composed of protein, a substance often
regarded as a food.293
In Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of
the FDA.294 The court opined:
Plaintiffs’ argument that starch blockers are food because they are
derived from food—kidney beans—is not convincing; if Congress
intended food to mean articles derived from food it would have so
specified. Indeed some articles that are derived from food are indisputably not food, such as caffeine and penicillin. In addition, all
articles that are classed biochemically as proteins cannot be food
either, because for example insulin, botulism toxin, human hair[,]
and influenza virus are proteins that are clearly not food.295

To determine the meaning of “food” in the parenthetical exception to
the structure-function drug definition, the Court of Appeals turned to
the FD&C Act’s definition of “food” in section 201(f).296 The court
held that the phrase “articles used for food or drink” in section 201(f)
referred solely to “common-sense” foods.297 The court thus essentially
incorporated the extra-legal, cultural understanding of “food” directly
into the law. It then set forth an extraordinarily influential elaboration, quoted frequently by the FDA ever since, of what “common
sense” foods were: “articles used by people in the ordinary way most
people use food—primarily for taste, aroma, or nutritive value.”298
The court’s description of the food category raises several interesting points. First, as the FDA itself has sometimes neglected to mention, the court referred to articles used primarily for taste, aroma, or
291
Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 880, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff’d, 713 F.2d
335 (7th Cir. 1983).
292
See § 201(g)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C).
293
Nutrilab, 547 F. Supp. at 882.
294
Nutrilab, 713 F.2d at 338–39.
295
Id. at 337.
296
Id. at 338 (citation omitted) (analyzing the scope of the “parenthetical ‘other than
food’ exclusion from the definition of drugs” in Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 201(g)(1)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2000)).
297
Id. at 339. Because starch blockers were not “chewing gum,” § 201(f)(2), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(f)(2), or “articles used for components of” food, § 201(f)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f)(3),
the court deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the word “food” in the parenthetical
exception from the drug definition referred to all of section 201(f) of the FD&C Act, or
solely to section 201(f)(1), the “common-sense food” provision. See id.
298
Id. at 338. The agency has referred to the “taste, aroma, or nutritive value” formulation at least 29 times in the Federal Register. LEXIS search in “FR-Federal Register”
database (Mar. 10, 2008) (using the following terms: <AGENCY (“food and drug”) and
(taste pre/2 aroma pre/2 “nutritive value”)>).
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nutritive value.299 The court explained that this qualifier was necessary because “some products such as coffee or prune juice are undoubtedly food but may be consumed on occasion for reasons other
than taste, aroma, or nutritive value.”300 Even this may not be a sufficient qualification, however; according to my informal polls, only a
minority of law students who drink coffee do so primarily for its taste
or aroma.
Second, the court’s inclusion of “taste” as a primary reason for
consuming food was clearly uncontroversial by 1983. In light of developments such as the diet soda craze of the 1960s, the rising popularity
of highly seasoned ethnic foods in the 1970s, and a generally “heightened appreciation for the pleasures of the table” throughout the period,301 there was simply no denying that Americans often consumed
foods mostly for their taste.302 As Figure 1 shows, food advertisers focused increasingly on taste through the 1950s, and although assertions about nutrition and health have been making a comeback since
then, flavor remains a chief emphasis in food advertising.303 The Seventh Circuit’s reference in Nutrilab to articles used “primarily for . . .
aroma” is both odd and superfluous; it seems to include air
fresheners, while not embracing any true “common sense” foods not
also covered by “taste,” “nutritive value,” or both.304 The reference to
“nutritive value,” although sensible, is ambiguous; as discussed below,
the FDA still does not have a clear idea of what exactly this phrase
means.305
A final notable aspect of the Nutrilab “common sense” food definition is that the definition does not exclude products consumed in a
drug dosage form.306 Indeed, the fact that starch blockers were sold
as tablets and capsules did not enter into the court’s reasoning at
all.307 By 1983, the year the Seventh Circuit decided Nutrilab, the FDA
had been regulating vitamin and mineral pills as food for more than
forty years.308 The following Part will describe how in 1994, the Diet299
The FDA has cabined “taste, aroma, or nutritive value” with the word “primarily”
only 15 of the 29 times it has invoked the phrase in the Federal Register. See LEXIS search
in “FR-Federal Register” database (Mar. 10, 2008) (search terms: <AGENCY (“food and
drug”) and (taste pre/2 aroma pre/2 “nutritive value”)>).
300
Nutrilab, 713 F.2d at 338.
301
LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 218.
302
See id. at 213–26.
303
See supra note 165 and accompanying figure.
304
See Nutrilab, 713 F.2d at 338.
305
See infra Part V.C.
306
See Nutrilab, 713 F.2d at 338.
307
For an example of an opinion that takes this into account, see Millet, Pit & Seed
Co. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84, 90–91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (finding that apricot kernels, widely used as a cancer remedy, were food, in part because they were sold in their
natural state and not in “pill, capsule, or liquid form”).
308
See supra Part III.B.
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ary Supplement Health and Education Act amended the FD&C Act to
sweep into the “food” category an enormous universe of additional
substances sold in drug dosage forms.309 Today, starch blockers are,
as a legal matter, “food.”

THE AMENDMENTS

OF THE

V
EARLY 1990S: FOOD IMPERIALISM

Through the 1970s and 1980s, growing societal and political pressure was aimed at lifting the rigorous requirement of premarket drug
review from foods and “natural” products making health-related
claims. In the early 1990s, Congress responded to these demands with
two important amendments to the FD&C Act: the Nutrition Labeling
and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA)310 and the Dietary Supplement
Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA).311 The former permitted conventional foods, under certain conditions, to make explicit disease prevention claims without subjecting themselves to the drug
regime.312 The latter recharacterized various types of products that
did not satisfy the Nutrilab “taste, aroma, or nutritive value” test as
food and permitted them to make structure-function claims, and
sometimes disease-prevention claims, without falling into the “drug”
category.313 These changes to the FD&C Act have significantly reshaped the legal categories of “food” and “drug”; many products that
formerly would have been classified as drugs, or as both food and
drugs, are now considered solely foods.
Various scientific, social, and public health developments combined to precipitate these changes in the law. First, starting in the
early 1970s, the medical community and the general public became
increasingly interested in the negative health effects of dietary fat,
cholesterol, and sodium, and the food industry developed a corresponding desire to take advantage of the science of “negative nutrition” in marketing their products.314 Second, the 1960s and 70s saw
the rise of a craze for the “natural.” American consumers increasingly
turned not only to “natural” foods, but also to “natural” remedies, and
the growing dietary supplement industry strove to profit from this
309

See infra Part V.B.
Nutrition and Labeling Education Act (NLEA), Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)).
311
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA), Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108
Stat. 4325 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
312
See infra Part V.A.
313
See infra Part V.B.
314
See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 212–14; LEVENSTEIN, supra note
167, at 202–12. For a list of prominent reports on diet and health from the 1970s and
1980, see Peter Barton Hutt, Regulatory Implementations of Dietary Recommendations, 36 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L. J. 66, 67–68 (1981).
310
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trend.315 Third, many in the antiestablishment-left developed hostility
to government intrusion in certain areas, including the field of natural medicines.316 Fourth, the rise of Reagan Republicanism in the
1980s reflected the increasing influence of a strain of libertarian
thought that was generally suspicious of government regulation of
commerce, including commercial speech.317 Finally, the emergence
of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s produced a new, highly vocal group of
activists who joined cancer victims in insisting on the right to control
their own health destinies.318
A. The NLEA and Disease Prevention Claims
As discussed above, until the mid-1980s, the FDA obstinately stuck
to its position that if a food’s labeling made a claim regarding a particular disease state, that food was also a drug. In 1984, however, the
FTC (which regulates food advertising) not only permitted, but actually lauded, a Kellogg’s campaign for All-Bran cereal that highlighted the relationship between dietary fiber and reduced cancer
risk.319 Discomfited by the inconsistency in the agencies’ positions,
and under pressure from scientific groups to permit disease prevention claims on food, the FDA reversed course in 1985, publicly stating
that it would permit such claims.320 The FDA then published proposed regulations and an interim enforcement policy that allowed
food manufacturers to make disease prevention claims on food, sub-

315
See HOOKER, supra note 54, at 348–49; LEVENSTEIN, supra note 167, at 160–69,
195–200.
316
See Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to Alternative Medicine, 24
AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 199 (1998) (“[S]ome attribute renewed consumer interest [in alternative medicine] of the 1960s and 1970s to alternative medicine’s reliance on natural remedies and spirituality, which appealed to the anti-establishment . . . counterculture
tendencies of the times.”).
317
See Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1278 (1993)
(“For the first time since Hoover, a [sitting] president [President Reagan] was actively
hostile to the modern administrative state, elected on a platform of ‘less government.’”);
Stephen Gardner, Litigation as a Tool in Food Advertising: A Consumer Advocacy Viewpoint, 39
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 291, 297–99 (2006) (discussing how “[t]he burgeoning growth of unfounded and illegal claims for foods’ health and nutritional benefits was a prime example
of the results of deregulation fever”).
318
See DAAIR Background, http://www.im-resource.com/html/sites_clients/daair/1_
daairinfo/1a_background.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (discussing the background of
Direct Access Alternative Information Resources (DAAIR), a “not-for-profit buyer’s club
and information provider” created in 1991 to enable AIDS and other chronic illness patients to have access to “complementary/alternative treatment”).
319
See Hutt, supra note 135, at 17–20. The FDA disagreed, calling the claims “misleading.” Id. at 48.
320
See id. at 48–50; see also HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 284.
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ject to certain conditions.321 The agency confusingly termed these
“health claims.”322
In 1990, before the FDA could complete its health-claims
rulemaking, Congress enacted the NLEA, which explicitly permitted
claims characterizing the relationship between a nutrient and “a disease or health-related condition.”323 The statute amended the FD&C
Act to provide that a disease prevention claim may be made with respect to food if the FDA authorizes the claim, by regulation, on the
basis of “significant scientific agreement.”324 The NLEA also
amended the FD&C Act’s definition of “drug” to include an exemption for foods with statements made in accordance with the NLEA.325
Pursuant to NLEA regulations promulgated in 1993,326 the FDA
has approved petitions for twelve disease claims based on a demonstration of “significant scientific agreement,” including, for example,
calcium and osteoporosis, sodium and hypertension, and dietary saturated fat and cholesterol.327 In 1999, the D.C. Circuit held in Pearson
v. Shalala328 that the FDA is obligated under the First Amendment to
permit some claims with less than significant scientific agreement if
they contain appropriate disclaimers.329 Four years later, in response
to a related subsequent decision by the district court,330 the FDA embraced a “credible scientific evidence” standard for “qualified” disease
claims.331 The FDA also established a premarket notification process
whereby the agency exercises “enforcement discretion” to permit such

321
See, e.g., Food Labeling; Health Messages and Label Statements; Reproposed Rule,
55 Fed. Reg. 5176 (Feb. 13, 1990) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); Food Labeling; Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,610 (Aug. 8, 1989) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 1); Food Labeling; Public Health Messages on Food Labels and Labeling; Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,843 (Aug. 4, 1987) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
322
HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 270–71.
323
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(r)(1)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1)(B)
(2000).
324
Id. § 403(r)(3)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B). In 1997, the FD&C Act was further
amended to allow disease prevention claims for food affirmed in “authoritative statements”
by other federal health agencies or the National Academy of Sciences. Id. § 403(r)(3)(C),
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(C).
325
Id. § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
326
See Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg.
2478, 2533 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20, 101).
327
See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.72–101.83 (2007).
328
164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
329
See id. at 658–60; see also Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2002)
(rejecting the FDA’s initial application of Pearson).
330
Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
331
Guidance for Industry and FDA: Interim Procedures for Qualified Health Claims in
the Labeling of Conventional Human Food and Human Dietary Supplements (2003)
(availability announced 68 Fed. Reg. 41,387, 41,388–89 (July 11, 2003)).

R

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-5\CRN508.txt

2008]

unknown

Seq: 47

FOOD, DRUGS AND DROODS

12-JUN-08

13:37

1137

claims if they include obligatory qualifying language that corresponds
to the strength of the scientific evidence.332
The disease-prevention claims permitted on food do not resemble typical drug claims. Even unqualified claims, approved by the
FDA pursuant to a petition, are couched in qualifying language (“may
reduce the risk of”)333 and presented, as required by the statute, “in
the context of a total daily diet.”334 Nonetheless, the NLEA represented a partial return to an earlier era, in which the labels of both
food and drugs explicitly claimed effectiveness against disease, thus
blurring the difference between the categories of “food” and “drug.”
The NLEA also empowered the FDA to issue regulations authorizing
implied disease claims, in the form of standardized statements characterizing the level of nutrients such as fat, cholesterol, sodium, and fiber in food.335 The resulting nutrient-content-claim regulations
contributed to a proliferation of statements such as “low fat” and “cholesterol free” on food labels.336 The NLEA labeling regime has undoubtedly influenced Americans’ conception of food. As eloquently
stated by Michael Pollan:
It was in the 1980s that food began disappearing from the American
supermarket, gradually to be replaced by “nutrients,” which are not
the same thing. Where once the familiar names of recognizable
comestibles—things like eggs or breakfast cereal or cookies—
claimed pride of place on the brightly colored packages crowding
the aisles, now new terms like “fiber” and “cholesterol” and “saturated fat” rose to large-type prominence. More important than
mere foods, the presence or absence of these invisible substances
was now generally believed to confer health benefits on their eaters.
Foods by comparison were coarse, old-fashioned and decidedly unscientific things—who could say what was in them, really?337

The very presence of disease claims on food, along with the atmosphere of chemical reductionism and scientific certainty surrounding

332
Id.; see also Food Labeling: Health Claims; Dietary Claims: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,040, 66,041 (Nov. 25, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
101) (seeking comments on alternatives for regulating qualified health claims).
333
This language appears in all of the approved health claims at 21 C.F.R. See 21
C.F.R. § 101.76(E) (2006); see also HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 294.
334
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(r)(3)(B)(iii)(ii), 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(r)(3)(B)(iii)(ii) (2000).
335
See id. § 403(q)(1)(D), (r)(1)(A), (r)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)(D), (r)(1)(A),
(r)(2).
336
58 Fed. Reg. 2410, 2410 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.14,
101.54–101.69) (regulating claims about the fat content of foods). The FDA had already
commenced the process of defining nutrient descriptors by regulation prior to the 1990
passage of the NLEA. See HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 216–17.
337
Michael Pollan, Unhappy Meals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, (Magazine), at 41.
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the entire NLEA approach, rendered the difference between food
and drugs more indistinct than it was in the pre-NLEA era.338
B. DSHEA: Where’s Herb?
Perhaps no class of product presents a starker challenge to the
notion of a clear food–drug dichotomy than the herbal and other botanical supplements traditionally used for medicinal purposes. Many
of the same herbs used as flavoring agents have also long been used to
prevent, treat, or cure disease.339 Even herbs with unpleasant tastes
are taken for remedial purposes in teas.340 In 1993, the chairman of a
U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee sent the following written question to Robert S. McCaleb, the president of the Herb Research Foundation: “To what extent do people consume herbal
products for food (e.g., taste, aroma, nutrition) or medicinal purposes?”341 McCaleb responded:
Herbal products are very diverse in their range of uses. . . . Nearly
one-third of [$1.3 billion in annual retail sales] is composed of
herbal teas, which are conventional foods valued for flavor or
aroma. The majority of the remaining products are sold in the
form of capsules, tablets or liquid extracts. . . . Some of the extracts
and all of the capsules and tablets are valued for something other
than flavor and aroma. The question of whether the intended effect is nutritional or medicinal depends entirely on definition. . . .
[H]erbal supplements in the quantities consumed generally provide
little “nutrition” in terms of vitamins, minerals, protein, and so on.
However, if we include in the definition of nutrition, substances
which protect health or aid in metabolic processes, herbal dietary
supplements clearly qualify.342

Until the very end of the twentieth century, the FDA seems never
to have taken a systematic approach to herbs, botanical products, fish
and plant oils, and other “natural” supplement ingredients. Both the
regulations approving food additives and the regulations confirming
food ingredients as “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) listed some
338
Scientific reductionism and nutritional science are further discussed in Pollan’s
article. See id. at 44–46.
339
See LEVENSTEIN, supra note 53, at 6.
340
See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
341
Letter from Edolphus Towns, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations of the H. Comm on Gov’t Operations to Robert S. McCaleb, President, Herb Research Found. (Aug. 3, 1993), in Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of
Dietary Supplements: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Operations, Subcomm. on
Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations, 103d Cong. 428 (1994) [hereinafter July 1993
FDA Hearings].
342
Letter from Robert S. McCaleb, President, Herb Research Foundation to Edolphus
Towns, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Human Res. and Intergovernmental Relations of the
H. Comm on Gov’t Operations (Aug. 23, 1993), in July 1993 FDA Hearings, supra note 341,
at 430.
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herbs.343 The sellers of many other herbs self-determined their products to be GRAS.344 The FDA apparently never maintained that
herbal products listed in the USP or NF were automatically drugs,345
but it almost always treated herbal supplements as drugs if their labeling contained disease claims.346 Interestingly, however, the agency
has long turned a blind eye to traditional Chinese medicine products,
even those with explicit disease claims.347
Between the early 1980s and the early 1990s, several developments converged to trigger a battle over the regulatory status of
herbal supplements.348 In the 1960s and 1970s, most herbal products
were manufactured by small niche companies.349 These businesses
advertised in the alternative press and avoided regulation by frequently changing labels, ingredients, and locations.350 In the 1980s,
however, the natural products business grew rapidly and was increasingly dominated by larger corporations.351 Herbal products were advertised more widely and became available in grocery stores and
drugstores as well as health food and specialty nutrition stores.352 The
herbal supplement industry was thus capable of mounting an organized and well-funded defense if the FDA abandoned its haphazard and
largely nonintrusive approach.
The agency did so in the late 1980s, commencing an aggressive
enforcement campaign against herbal and other natural supplements,
such as evening primrose oil.353 When such products bore disease
claims, the FDA used its drug authorities against them. In the absence
of such claims, the agency did not hesitate to employ its food additive
powers, even against those supplements that did not obviously provide
343

See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,698 (June 18,

1993).
344

See id.
See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 337 (2d Cir. 1977)
(noting that the FDA does not treat all substances listed in the USP and NF as drugs, but
rather “single[s] out” substances based on other factors).
346
See, e.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 346 (1948) (treating “compounds of
various vitamins, minerals and herbs” as drugs when accompanied by pamphlets that made
misleading disease claims). The FDA’s pre-1994 position regarding the classification of
herbal products that made only structure-function claims is difficult to determine, because
virtually all of the agency’s enforcement actions were against articles making only disease
claims or both disease claims and structure-function claims.
347
HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN, supra note 79, at 619.
348
See HILTS, supra note 187, at 283–84.
349
See id.
350
See id.
351
See id.
352
See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,690 (June 18,
1993).
353
See F.D.A in Battle on Health Food Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1989, at B7.
345
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any “taste, aroma, or nutritive value.”354 As explained by FDA official
Michael Taylor:
[W]e agree that there ought to be an effort to recognize that dietary
supplements have attributes that, as a practical matter, place them
somewhere between what people think of as foods and what people
think of as drugs. But under the current statute we have those two
choices to make.355

The NLEA of 1990 authorized disease prevention claims (socalled “health claims”) for dietary supplements as well as conventional
foods.356 However, instead of subjecting claims for supplements to the
same approval procedure and “significant scientific agreement” standard that the statute established for conventional foods, Congress provided that supplements would “be subject to a procedure and
standard, respecting the validity of such claim, established by [FDA
regulation].”357 The FDA, under new Commissioner David Kessler,
did not accept the invitation to establish a more liberal standard for
dietary supplement claims. Instead, it proposed that disease prevention claims for supplements be subject to the same “significant scientific agreement” standard that applied with respect to conventional
foods.358 This proposal provoked an unprecedented flood of irate
mail and telephone calls to the agency and Congress.359 After a oneyear moratorium imposed by Congress,360 the FDA once again proposed to apply the same approach to health claims for dietary supplements as was used for conventional foods.361 Congress stepped in
354
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Operations, Subcomm. on Human Res. and
Intergovernmental Relations, 103d Cong. 46–48 (1993) (testimony of Stephen H. McNamara,
Counsel, Utah Natural Products Alliance), in July 1993 FDA Hearings, supra note 341, at
46–48. But see United States v. Two Plastic Drums of . . . Black Currant Oil, 984 F.2d 814,
815, 820 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the FDA’s assertion that black currant oil was an unapproved food additive when combined solely with the substances used to market it in capsule form). On the origins of the “taste, aroma, or nutritive value” formulation, see supra
Part IV.
355
Hearing of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103 Cong. 61 (1993) (statement
of Michael Taylor, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, FDA).
356
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990)
(codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)).
357
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(r)(5)(D), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D)
(2000).
358
Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 56 Fed. Reg. 60,537,
60,539 (Nov. 27, 1991).
359
See Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Operations, Subcomm. on Human Res.
and Intergovernmental Relations, 103d Cong 72–73 (July 20, 1993) (testimony of Bruce Silverglade, Director of Legal Affairs, Center for Science in the Public Interest), in July 1993 FDA
Hearings, supra note 341, at 72–73; HILTS, supra note 187, at 285–86.
360
See Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491, 4500
(1992).
361
See Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,700 (June 18, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
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again, this time with the Dietary Supplement Health and Education
Act of 1994 (DSHEA).
DSHEA created a new regulatory regime for supplements, and, in
some ways, significantly reduced the FDA’s power over them.362 The
statute formally establishes a new product category of “dietary supplement,” which it defines as
a product (other than tobacco) intended to supplement the diet
that bears or contains one or more of the following dietary ingredients: (A) a vitamin; (B) a mineral; (C) an herb or other botanical;
(D) an amino acid; (E) a dietary substance for use by man to supplement the diet by increasing the total dietary intake; or (F) a concentrate, metabolite, constituent, extract, or combination of any
ingredient described in clause (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E).363

A “dietary supplement” must also be “intended for ingestion” in “tablet, capsule, powder, softgel, gelcap, or liquid form,” or in another
form if it is “not represented as conventional food and is not represented for use as a sole item of a meal or of the diet.”364 Finally, a
“dietary supplement” must be labeled as such.365
Several aspects of the regulation of dietary supplements under
DSHEA are important to note. First, a dietary supplement is now
“deemed to be a food” for most purposes under the FD&C Act, even if
it is not a “common sense” food under Nutrilab.366 Second, dietary
supplement ingredients are nonetheless excluded from the definition
of “food additive.”367 This releases them from the premarket approval
requirement applicable to most conventional food ingredients that
are not generally recognized as safe.368 Third, DSHEA excludes supplements that make structure-function claims from the definition of
“drug”369 and thus from the new drug premarket approval requirements. This exclusion applies to all dietary supplements, not just
those that are “common sense” foods such as vitamins and miner362
See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat.
4325 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2000)). But see Peter Barton Hutt,
FDA Statutory Authority to Regulate the Safety of Dietary Supplements, 31 AM. J. L. & MED. 155,
157 (contending, with respect to safety regulation, that “on balance the FD&C Act, as
amended by DSHEA, provides somewhat greater FDA regulatory authority over dietary
supplements than over conventional food”).
363
Id. § 3(a), 108 Stat. at 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1) (2000)).
364
Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(2)) (incorporating this list of forms by reference to Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 411(c)(1)(B)(i)–(ii), 21 U.S.C.
§ 350(c)(1)(B)(i)–(ii)).
365
Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(2)(C)).
366
Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)).
367
Id. § 3(b) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(6)).
368
The food additive petition and approval process is set forth at Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act § 409(b), (c), 21 U.S.C. § 348(b), (c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
369
See § 3(a), 108 Stat. at 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)).
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als.370 However, instead of simply relying on the parenthetical food
exception from the structure-function branch of the drug definition,
DSHEA added a new section significantly titled “Statements of Nutritional Support.”371 This section requires a supplement manufacturer,
unlike a conventional food manufacturer, to have “substantiation” of
a structure-function claim, to accompany the statement with a prominent disclaimer, and to notify the FDA of its use of the claim within 30
days after the commencement of marketing.372 Although the legislative process leading to the enactment of DSHEA was triggered largely
by controversy over the FDA’s refusal to create a separate NLEA
health claims procedure for dietary supplements,373 the enacted statute did not require the FDA to do so. To date, the agency, using a
process equivalent to that used for conventional foods,374 has approved only two unqualified health claims for dietary supplements.375
Denied the right to liberally communicate the benefits of their
products through disease prevention claims (health claims),376 supplement manufacturers turned instead to structure-function claims.
Before 1994, there was no hint of how creatively such claims could be
used. After the enactment of DSHEA, the dietary supplement industry re-imagined structure-function claims, expanding them well beyond the “helps weight loss” and “builds strong bones” statements that
had occasionally been used with conventional foods.377 St. John’s
370

See Nutrilab Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1983).
§ 6, 108 Stat. at 4329 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)) (emphasis added). This
section of DSHEA appears at Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(r)(6), without
the title “Statements of Nutritional Support.”
372
See id. The mandatory disclaimer states: “This statement has not been evaluated by
the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure,
or prevent any disease.” Id. § 6, 108 Stat. at 4329 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C)).
373
See generally Meghan Colloton, Comment, Dietary Supplements: A Challenge Facing the
FDA in Mad Cow Disease Prevention, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 495, 512–24 (2002) (offering a historical perspective on the struggle that led to DSHEA’s enactment).
374
See Dietary Supplements; Comments on Report of the Commission on Dietary Supplement Labels, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,633, 23,634 (Apr. 29, 1998) (“The [FD&C Act] provides
that FDA may authorize a health claim for a conventional food only if the agency determines . . . ‘that there is significant scientific agreement, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate such claims, that the claim is supported by such
evidence.’”) (quoting Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 403(r)(3)(B)(i), 21 U.S.C.
343 § (r)(3)(B)(i)).
375
See Health Claims: Calcium and Osteoporosis, 21 C.F.R. § 101.72 (2007) (permitting claim that calcium may reduce the risk of osteoporosis); Health Claims: Folate and
Neural Tube Defects, 21 C.F.R. § 101.79 (2007) (permitting claim that folate may reduce
the risk of neural tube defects).
376
See generally Dana Ziker, Regulating Functional Foods: Pre- and Post-Market Strategy,
2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0024 (2002), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/
dltr/articles/2002dltr0024.html (describing the ongoing battle between the FDA and an
ever-evolving food industry).
377
See CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FDA, CLAIMS THAT CAN BE MADE
FOR CONVENTIONAL FOODS AND DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS (2003), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/
371
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Wort, used overseas as a remedy for depression, might be labeled
“Promotes Positive Mood & Healthy Emotional Balance.” Saw Palmetto, a well-known European treatment for enlarged prostate, might
claim “Supports Healthy Prostate Function.” The FDA endorsed just
such an approach in its DSHEA regulations, allowing the use of terms
such as “stimulate,” “maintain,” “support,” “regulate,” and “promote.”378 The agency also ruled that statements concerning nonserious “natural life state” conditions, such as noncystic acne, morning
sickness, hot flashes, and mild geriatric memory loss, were permissible
subjects of structure-function claims.379 Grocery and drugstores
shelves are now filled with dietary supplements that make structurefunction claims with a wink at consumers interested in using them to
fight disease.
DSHEA dramatically expands the legal category of “food” far beyond Nutrilab’s “common sense” notion of articles used primarily for
taste, aroma, or nutritive value. Vitamin and mineral pills, which were
treated as food even before DSHEA, have indisputable nutritive
value.380 By contrast, many of the amino acids, herbs, and botanicals
that are now classified as “food” by DSHEA do not have significant
nutritive value, at least in the traditional sense of the term “nutritive.”
Moreover, DSHEA encompasses concentrates, metabolites, constituents, and extracts of each of these ingredients.381 The statute thus
challenges the common cultural understanding of “food” and further
obscures the distinction between “food” and “drugs.” Today, a capsule containing the extract of a foul-tasting herb, sold in a pill bottle
with barely disguised disease claims on its label is, for legal purposes, a
“food.” At the beginning of this story, such a product was a prototypical drug.

~dms/hclaims.html (explaining possible structure-function relationships between a nutrient and its purported function).
378
See Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,624, 23,625
(proposed Apr. 29, 1998) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
379
Regulations on Statements Made for Dietary Supplements Concerning the Effect of
the Product on the Structure or Function of the Body, 65 Fed. Reg. 1000, 1020 (Jan. 6,
2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). For a complete list of the claims explicitly
permitted or forbidden in the preamble to the final rule, see HUTT, MERRILL, & GROSSMAN,
supra note 79, at 282. Shortly after issuing this rule, FDA advised that “natural life state”
claims should not be made with respect to conditions associated with pregnancy, such as
morning sickness, because of the risks that dietary supplements might pose to unborn
children. Statement, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., FDA Statement Concerning
Structure/Function Rule and Pregnancy Claims (Feb. 9, 2000), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/
topics/NEWS/NEW00715.html.
380
See infra notes 391–97 and accompanying text.
381
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201 (ff)(1)(F), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(ff)(1)(F) (2000).
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But does DSHEA really expand the category of “food,” or does it
establish a distinct intermediate category? In drafting the statute,
Congress seemed to recognize the limits of its power to reshape cultural concepts. Instead of simply adding dietary supplements to the
statutory definition of “food,” DSHEA defines them separately and
provides that they are “deemed to be a food” for most regulatory purposes.382 Furthermore, DSHEA and its regulations impose certain
unique requirements on dietary supplements that perpetuate the cultural understanding that supplements are different from conventional
foods.383 For example, dietary supplement labels bear a boldly titled
“Supplement Facts” box, rather than the “Nutrition Facts” box that
appears on conventional foods.384 Moreover, as noted above, structure-function claims on dietary supplements must be accompanied by
a prominent disclaimer that is not required for conventional foods.385
In fact, DSHEA seems to have helped forge a new product category in everyday vernacular. In 1989, five years before the enactment
of the statute, the term “dietary supplement” appeared in a nonlegal
context in only 29 articles in a database of 12 major American newspapers.386 In 1999, the corresponding number was 186, and by 2003 it
was 310.387 Moreover, by legally grouping vitamin-mineral products
with herbal and botanical supplements, DSHEA helped link them in
the popular consciousness. In 1989, 17 articles in the same database
mentioned “vitamin” or “mineral” within five words of “herbal” or “botanical.”388 By 1999, that number was 75.389 This trend was no doubt
helped along by the fact that in the late 1990s, the makers of Centrum
and One-A-Day vitamins took advantage of the commercial opportunities created by DSHEA and started selling herbal products under the
same brand names.390
382

Id. § 201(f), (ff), 21 U.S.C. § 321(f), (ff).
See supra notes 362–75 and accompanying text.
384
Compare Nutrition Labeling of Dietary Supplements, 21 C.F.R. 101.36(e) (2007)
(setting forth the “Supplement Facts” requirements for dietary supplements), with Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d) (2007) (setting forth the “Nutrition Facts”
requirements for conventional foods).
385
See supra notes 372 and accompanying text.
386
LEXIS search of 12 major U.S. newspapers (Mar. 10, 2008) (author’s self-constructed database includes newspapers that have been fully searchable on Lexis since at
least Jan. 1, 1989) (search terms: <“dietary supplement” and not (Congress or FDA or
“food and drug administration” or law or statute)>) (date restricted to 1989).
387
Id. (date restricted to 1999); id. (date restricted to 2003).
388
Id. (search terms: <(vitamin or mineral) w/5 (herbal or botanical)>) (date restricted to 1989).
389
Id. (date restricted to 1999).
390
See Michael Wilke, Bayer Boosts One-A-Day with Herbal Supplements, ADVERTISING AGE,
July 20, 1998, at 4; Whitehall’s Centrum Herbals Six Product-Line Launching Mid-November, 6
TAN SHEET, Oct. 26, 1998, at 16.
383
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C. “Nutritive Value”
Because the “common sense” definition of food is an article used
primarily for its “taste, aroma, or nutritive value,” the breadth of the
category depends largely on the meaning of “nutritive value.” In recent years, the FDA has suggested that “nutritive value” might be a
surprisingly expansive concept.
The agency first started wrestling with the meaning of “nutritive
value” after the passage of the NLEA. The FDA’s health claims regulations, finalized in 1993, stated that to be eligible for a health claim, a
substance must “contribute taste, aroma, or nutritive value, or any
other technical effect listed in [§] 170.3(o) to the food.”391 The rule
also provided that “[n]utritive value means a value in sustaining human
existence by such processes as promoting growth, replacing loss of essential nutrients, or providing energy.”392 The FDA explained that its
use of the phrase “such processes as” conveyed “a measure of flexibility that . . . is necessary for evaluating future [health claims] petitions. . . . [T]here may be a wide array of substances that could
logically supply nutritive value.”393
In 1994, when the FDA applied the same health claims requirements to dietary supplements, it once again stressed the flexibility of
the phrase “nutritive value.”394 To provide some guidance, the agency
stated that in assessing whether a substance provides nutritive value,
“[i]n general, the agency will look for evidence that the claimed effect
on disease is associated with the normal maintenance of human existence.”395 The FDA denied requests that it revise the definition of
“nutritive value” to embrace disease prevention generally, because
“the relationship between a food or a food component to a disease is
quite different from that of a drug. . . . [I]t has proved difficult to
demonstrate causal associations between specific dietary factors and
chronic or other diseases.”396 This was only a question of semantics,
however, for the FDA has approved various “health claims” that indisputably correlate the increased consumption of particular dietary substances with a reduced risk of particular diseases.397
391
Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg.
2478, 2533 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(b)(3)(1)).
392
Id. (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(3) (emphasis added)).
393
Id. at 2478 (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20 & 101).
394
Food Labeling; General Requirements for Health Claims for Dietary Supplements,
59 Fed. Reg. 395, 407 (proposed Jan. 4, 1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 20 & 101).
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
See, e.g., Health Claims: Calcium and Osteoporosis, 21 C.F.R. § 101.72 (1997)
(describing how calcium helps to reduce the risk of osteoporosis); Health Claims: Soy Protein and Risk of Coronary Heart Disease (CHD), 21 C.F.R. § 101.82(a)(3) (1999) (“[T]he
addition of soy protein to a diet that is low in saturated fat and cholesterol may also help to
reduce the risk of CHD.”).
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In 2000, the FDA demonstrated how far it is willing to stretch the
notion of “nutritive value” when it approved health claims petitions
filed by the manufacturers of two cholesterol-lowering bread spreads
(Take Control and Benecol). The beneficial effect of these products
was due to the presence of plant sterol esters in the former and plant
stanol esters in the latter. These substances apparently lower cholesterol by preventing the absorption of cholesterol into the intestines.398
Having already declined to challenge the manufacturers’ self-determination that plant sterol/stanol esters were GRAS,399 the FDA authorized health claims about the role of these substances in reducing the
risk of coronary heart disease (CHD).400 Since plant sterol/stanol esters clearly did not contribute taste, aroma, or a § 170.3(o) technical
effect to food, the FDA resorted to stating that they contributed “nutritive value.”401 It reasoned: “The scientific evidence suggests that the
cholesterol-lowering effect of plant sterol esters is achieved through
an effect on the digestive process. . . . The digestive process is one of
the metabolic processes necessary for the normal maintenance of
human existence.”402
The FDA’s assertion that plant sterol/stanol esters contribute
“nutritive value” is remarkable. These substances do not act by being
incorporated into the body, but by preventing the absorption of cholesterol into the body. In Nutrilab—the source of the “taste, aroma, or
nutritive value” test—the court considered it so obvious that starch
blockers did not contribute “nutritive value” that it did not even
bother to explain its basis for this conclusion.403 Yet starch blockers
allegedly controlled weight by preventing the absorption of starch,404
just as plant sterol/stanol esters reduce the risk of CHD by preventing
the absorption of cholesterol. If in the 1980s, the FDA had applied
the same reasoning to starch blockers that it applied to Benecol
twenty years later, the agency would have concluded that starch blockers were, in fact, common-sense foods. In approving the plant sterol/
stanol ester petitions, the agency embraced a notion of “nutritive
value” so expansive that it could potentially apply to any drug ingested
for disease prevention.
398
See Food Labeling: Health Claims; Plant Sterol/Stanol Esters and Coronary Heart
Disease, 65 Fed. Reg. 54,686, 54,690–700 (Sept. 8, 2000) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
399
See id. at 54,688–89.
400
Id. at 54,717–19.
401
See id. at 54,688.
402
Id.
403
See Nutrilab, Inc. v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1983); see also United
States v. Undetermined Quantities of “Cal-Ban 3000,” 776 F. Supp. 249, 255 (E.D.N.C.
1991) (finding that a starch-blocker product was not used for nutritive value because “advertisements make it clear that a person who chooses to ingest Cal-Ban would be doing so
to prevent nutrition from entering the body, rather than to allow it”).
404
See Nutrilab, 713 F.2d at 336.
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CONCLUSION: “DROODS”
The history recounted in this article suggests that legal definitions of basic-level cultural categories like “food” and “drug” will never
result in bright lines, in part because the cultural categories themselves are strikingly imprecise and malleable. Moreover, my research
suggests that although cultural categories inevitably shape and blur
corresponding legal categories, legal categories in turn can play a
powerful role in molding cultural conceptions. In short, the story of
the legal and cultural notions of “food” and drug” is one of synergistic
interaction.
To further understand this symbiotic process at work, consider
the following hypothetical scenario: Congress amends the FD&C Act
to create a new category called “droods,” encompassing all articles
(whether presently “food” or “drugs”) that are “intentionally ingested
by man.” The amendments also establish a unified regulatory system
applicable to all droods. To sell a drood legally, a manufacturer must
either determine that the drood is GRAS or obtain FDA premarket
approval of an application, similar to a food additive petition, showing
a “reasonable certainty of no harm.”405 The manufacturer of a drood
claiming to diagnose, cure, mitigate, or treat a disease must, unless
the drood is generally recognized as effective, acquire premarket approval of an NDA-like application setting forth “substantial evidence”
of effectiveness.406 A drood making a disease prevention claim, by contrast, can enter the market if the agency approves a premarket application, akin to a health claims petition, demonstrating that there is
“significant scientific agreement” in support of the claim.407 Finally,
structure-function claims for droods are not subject to any premarket
review; the FDA will police them using its traditional enforcement
powers against misbranding.
What, if anything, is wrong with this scheme? Do the flaws, if any,
derive from the elimination of the legal distinction between “food”
and “drug?” Could the proposal be successfully implemented in our
405
See S. REP. NO. 2422, at 5301 (1958) (describing the standard used for food additive
petitions). To protect the public against inaccurate or fraudulent self-determinations of
GRAS status, this hypothetical regime could require manufacturers to provide the FDA
with premarket notification of all “new” drood ingredients and further mandate that this
notification set forth the manufacturer’s basis for concluding that the ingredient is GRAS.
A similar requirement currently applies to “new dietary ingredients” in dietary supplements. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 413(a), (c), 21 U.S.C. § 350b(a), (c)
(2000).
406
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (providing the
standard used for approval of new drugs). The statutory scheme could, of course, require
that drood manufacturers present their evidence of safety and and their evidence of effectiveness in a single premarket application.
407
Id. § 403(r)(3)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B) (providing the standard used for
health claims).
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society, which has long viewed “food” and “drug” as different, though
overlapping, categories? Would the very institution of such an approach eventually forge “drood” into a cultural category that Americans could accept as the organizing concept of a regulatory scheme?
While this article does not offer a definitive answer to any of these
questions, I hope it has provided some drood for thought.

